
Author . 



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16 — 4737?-9 e^O 



/ 
56th Congress, I SENATE. j Docltvient 



M Session. \ \ No. 148. 



PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. 

Jaxuary 30, 1899.— Read and laid on table. 
J.\NU.\RY 31, 1901. — Injunction of secrecy removed. 

In the Senate of the United States, 

February 5, 1901. 
Ordered, That there he printed for the use of the Senate three thousand copies of 
the instructions and all accompanying papers of the President to the commissioners 
who negotiated the treaty with Spain at Paris. 

Attest: Charles G. Bennett, 

Secretary. 



To the Senate of the United States: 

In answer to the resolution of the Senate of January 6, 1899, request- 
ing- the President, so far as in his judginent not inconsistent with the 
public interest, to connnunicate to the Senate ''all instructions given 
by him to the commissioners for negotiating- the pending treaty with 
Spain, and all correspondence between the P^xecutive or the Depart- 
ment of State with such commissioners, and all reports made by them 
to him or to the Department." I transmit herewith a report from the 
Secretarv of State, together with the papers called for by the said 
resolution, so far as it is, in my judgment, not inconsistent with the 
public interest to communicate them. The papers transmitted inchide 
"all instructions given by" me "to the commissioners for negotiating 
the pending treat}' with Spain." 

J William McKinlet. 

Executive Mansion, 

Washington^ Jan uary 30, 1899. 



To the President: 

The undersigned, Secretary of State, to whom vou referred a reso- 
lution adopted in the Senate^ of the United States on the 6th instant, 
reading as follows: 

Resolved, That the President of the United States, so far as in his judgment not 

inconsistent with the public interest, be requested to communicate to the Senate all 

\. instructions given by him to the commissioners for negotiating the pending treaty 

I with Spain, and all correspondence between the Executive or the Department of State 

with such commissioners, and all reports made by them to him or to the Department — 

has the honor to lay l)efore the President, with a view to their trans- 
mission to the Senate in answer to the foregoing resolution, should the 
President deem it expedient to so do, copies of the original instruc- 
tions given to the American peace commissioners before their depar- 
ture, together with copies of the reports and instructions exchanged 
by telegraph with the conmiissioners in the course of the negotiation. 



E7Z^ 

2 PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. 

exceptino- only certain matters of collateral import which, in the opin- 
ion of the undersigned, it would be inconsistent with the public interest 
to communicate, but which, however, in no wise affected the negotia- 
tion as between the United States and Spain, 

The undersigned believes that the telegraphic correspondence so sub- 
mitted contains all that is necessary to a full understanding of the peace 
negotiations, and therefore does not su])mit the more detailed reports 
received by mail after the cal)led suuunari(\s and inquiries had been 
received and acted upon, inasmuch as th(\v fully appear in all essential 
particulars in the protocols and accompanying papers already laid be- 
fore the Senate with the treaty of peac^ signed December 10, 1898. 

Respectfully submitted. 

John Hay. 

Departmi<:nt of State, 

Wa-sJihigtori^ J<(/ia<(i'y 30, 1899. 



List of Papers. 

1. September It), 1898. Instructions of the President to tlie United States peace 

conmiissioners. 
lA. August 26. Instructions to the Evacuation Connnissioners of Puerto Rico. 
IB. August 26. Instructions to the Evacuation ('onunissioners of Cuba. 
IC. July 18. War Department, General Order, No. 101. 

2. September 28. Mr. Day to the President. (Telegram.) 

3. September 28. The President to Mr. Day. (Telegram.) 

4. September 28. Mr. Day to the President. 

5. September 28. The President to Mr. Day. 

6. September 29. The President to Mr. Day. (Telegram.) 

7. September 30. Mr. Day to the President. (Telegram.) 

8. September 30. The President to Mr. Day. (Telegram.) 

9. October 1. Mr. Day to the President. (Telegram.) 

10. (No. 1). Octobers. Mr. Day to I\ I r. Hay. (Telegram.) 

11. (No. 2). October 4. Mr. Day to Mr. Hay. 

12. October 4. President of France to the President. 

13. October 5. Mr. Hav to Mr. Day. (Telegram. ] 

14. October 6. Mr. Hay to Mr. Day. (Telegram.) 

15. (No. 3). October?. Mr. Day to Mr. Hav. (Telegram.) 

16. (No. 4). October 7. Mr. Day to Mr. Hay. 

17. October 7. Mr. Hav to Mr. Day. (Telegram.) 

17A. October 7. The President to Mr. Day. (Telegram.) 
17B. (No. 5). Mr. Day to the President. (Telegram.) 

18. (No. 6). October 8. Mr. Dav to Mr. Hay. (Telegram.) 

19. OctoI)er8. Mr. Hay to Mr. Day. (Telegram.) 

20. (No. 7). October 8. Mr. Day to Mr. Hay. (Telegram.) 

21. October 8. Mr. Hav to Mr. Dav. (Telegram.) 

22. (No. 8). October 9. ' IMr. Dav to Mr. Hay. (Telegram.) 
(No. 9). October 12. Mr. Day to Mr. Hay. 
October 13. Mr. Hay to Mr. Dav. (Telegram.) 
October 14. Mr. Hay to Mr. Day. (Telegram. ) 
[No. 10). October 17. Mr. Dav to Mr. Hay. (Telegram.) 
'No. 11). October 17. Mr. Day to Mr. Hav. (Telegram.) 
(No. 12). October 19. Mr. Day to Mr. Hay. (Telegram.) 

29. October 19. Mr. Hay to Mr. Day. (Telegram. ) 

30. (No. 13). October 22. Mr. Dav to Mr. Hay. (Telegram.) 

31. (No. 14). October 22. Mr. Day to Mr. Hay. (Telegram.) 

32. October 23. Mr. Hay to Mr. Day. (Telegram.) 

33. October 24. Mr. Hay to Mr. Dav. (Telegram.) 

34. (No. 15). October 25. Mr. Dav to Mr. Hav. (Telegram.) 

35. October 25. Mr. Hav to Mr. Day. (Telegram.) 

36. (No. 16). October 25. The Peace Commissioners to Mr. Hay. (Telegram.) 

37. October 26. Mr. Hay to Mr. Day. 



PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. 

38. (No. 17). October 27. Mr. Day to Mr. Hay. 

39. (No. 17A). October 27. Mr Day to Mr. Adee for the President. 

40. (No. 18). October 27. Mr. Da v to Mr. Hay. (Telegram.) 

41. October 27. ]\Ir. Hay to Mr. Ihiy. 

42. October 28. Mr. Hay to Mr. Day. (Telegram.) 

42A. October 28. Mr. Hay to Mr. Day. (Telegram; personal.) 

43. (No. 19). October 29. Mr. Day to Mr. Hay. 

44. October 30. Mr. Hay to Mr. Day. (Telegram.) 

45. October 30. jNIr. Frve to Mr. Adee for President. (Telegram.) 

46. November 1. Mr. Hay to Mr. Frye. (Telegram.) 

47. November 1. Mr. Hay to :Mr. Day. (Telegram.) 

48. November 3. Mr. Day to .Mr. Adee for President. (Telegram.) 

49. November 3. J\lr. Hay to i\Ir. Day. 

50. November 4. Mr. Day to Mr. Adee for President. (Telegram.) 

51. November 5. Mr. Hay to Mr. Day. (Telegram.) 

52. (No. 20) . November 5. Mr. Day to Mr. Hay. (Telegram.) 

53. (No. 21). November 9. Mr. Dav to Mr. Hay. (Telegram.) 

54. (No. 22). November 10. Mr. Day to Mr. Hay. (Telegram.) 

55. (No. 23). November 11. Peace Commissioners to Mr. Hay. (Telegram.) 

56. November 13. :\Ir. Hay to "Sir. Day. (Telegram.) 

57. Novend)er 15. Mr. Day to Mr. Adee for President. (Telegram.) 

58. (No. 24). November 15. Mr. Moore to Mr. Hay. (Telegram.) 

59. November 15. Mr. Hay to Mr. Day. (Telegram.) 

60. November 16. Mr. Hay to Mr. Day. (Telegram.) 

61. (No. 25). November 18' Mr. Moore to Mr. Hay. (Telegram.) 

62. November 18. Mr. Day to Mr. Adee for President. (Telegram.) 

63. November 18. jNIr. HaV to Mr. Dav. (Telegram. ) 

64. November 19. Mr. Hay to Mr. Day. (Telegram.) 

65. (No. 26). November 21. Mr. Day to Mr. Hay. (Telegram.) 
66.' November 22. Mr. Day to Mr. Adee for President. (Telegram.) 

67. November 22. Mr. Hay to Mr. Day. 

68. (No. 26 A). November 23. Mr. Day to Mr. Hay. (Telegram.) 

69. (No. 27). November 25. Mr. Moore to Mr. Hav. (Telegram.) 
70." (No. 28). November 25. Mr. Davis to Mr. Hav. 

70A. (No. 29). November 25. Mr. Gray to Mr. Hay. (Telegram.) 

71. November 25. Mr. Hay to Mr. Day. (Telegram.) 
71 A. November 27. Mr. Day to Mr. Hay. (Telegram.) 

72. November 29. Mr. Hay to Mr. Day." (Telegram.) 

73. (No.31). Novend)er29. Mr. Day to Mr. Hay. (Telegram.) 
73A. November 29. The President to Mr. Dav. (Telegram.) 
73B. November 29. Mr. Hay to Mr. Day. (Telegram. ) 

74. (No. 32). November 29. Mr. Moore to Mr. Hav. (Telegram.) 

75. (No. 33). November 30. Mr. Moore to Mr. Hay. (Telegram.) 

76. (No. 35). December 1. Mr. Day to Mr. Hay (Telegram.) 

77. December 1. Mr. Hay to Mr. Day. (Telegram.) 

78. December 1. Mr. Hav to INlr. Dav. (Telegram. ) 

79. (No. 36) . December 3'. Mr. Dav to Mr. Hay. (Telegram.) 

80. December 3. Mr. Hav to Mr. Dav. (Telegram.) 

81. (No. 37). Decembers! Mr. Dav to Mr. Hay. (Telegram.) 

82. December 8. Mr. Hay to ]Mr. Day. (Telegram.) 

83. December 10. Mr. Moore to Mr. Hav. (Telegram.) 

84. December 10. Mr. Day to Mr. Hay." (Telegram.) 

85. December 16. Mr. Moore to Mr. Hay. 



INSTRUCTIONS TO THE UNITED STATES PEACE COMMISSIONERS. 

By a protocol signed at Washington August 12, 1898, a copy of 
which is herewith inclosed, it was agreed that the United States and 
Spain would each appoint not more than live commissioners to treat of 
peace, and that the commissioners so appointed should meet at Paris 
not later than October 1, 1898, and proceed to the negotiation and 
conclusion of a treaty of peace, which treaty should be subject to 
ratification according to the respective constitutional forms of the two 
lountries. 



4 PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. 

For the purpose of carrjing into effect this stipulation I have 
appointed j^ou as commissioners on the part of the United States to 
meet and confer with commissioners on the part of Spain. 

As an essential preliminarv to the agreement to appoint commis- 
sioners to treat of peace this Government re(iuired of that of Spain 
the unqualified concession of the foUowino- precise demands: 

1. The relinquishment of all claim of sovereigntv over and title to 
Cuba. 

2. The cession to the Ignited States of Porto Kico and other islands 
under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies. 

3. The cession of an island in the Ladrones, to l)e selected by the 
United States. 

4. The immediate evacuation l)v Spain of Cuba. Porto Rico, and 
other Spanish islands in the West Indies. 

5. The occupation t)y the United States of the city, bay, and harbor 
of Manila pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace which should 
determine the control, disposition, and government of the Philippines. 

These demands were conceded by Spain, and their concession was, 
as you will perceive, solemnly recorded in the protocol of the 12th of 
August. 

By article 1 of that instrument Spain agreed to '' relinquish all claim 
of sov'ereignty over and title to Cuba." 

By article 2 she agnM>d to "cede to the United States the island of 
Porto Rico and other islands now under Si)anish sovereignty in the 
West Indies, and also an island in the Ladrones to be selected by the 
United States.'' 

By article 8 it was declared that the United States would "occupy 
and hold the city, bay, and harbor of Manila, pending the conclusion of 
a treaty of peace Mhich shall determine the control. dis]M)sition, and 
government of the Pliilij)pines." 

P)V aiticle 4 i)rovisi()n was made for the immediate evacuation of 
Cul)a. Porto Rico, and other Spanish islands in the West Indies, as 
follows: 

Spain will immediately evacuate Cuba, Porte Ricn, aud other islands now under 
Spanish sovereignty in "the West Indies; and to this end each Government will, 
within ten days after the signing of this protoi'ol, appoint commissioners, and the 
connnissioners'so appointed shall, within thirty days after the signing of this proto- 
col, meet at Habana for the purpose of arranging and carrying out the details of the 
aforesaid evacuation of ('ul)a and the adjacent Spanish islands; and each Govern- 
ment will, within ten clays after the signing of this protocol, also appoint other com- 
missioners, who shall, within thirty days after the signing of this jirotocol, meet 
at San Juan, in Porto Kico, for the purpose of arranging and carrying out the details 
of the aforesaid evacuation of Porto Kico and other islands now under Spanish sover- 
eignty in the West Indies. 

The conmiissioners referred to in the foregoing article have been 
appointed, and they are now in session at Habana and San Juan, 
respectively. A copy of their instructions is herewith inclosed. 

By these instructions you will observe that the evacuation of Cuba, 
Porto Rico, and other Spanish islands in th(^ West Indies is treated as 
a military operation, and will, when carried into effect, leave the evac- 
uated places in the military occupation of the United States. The pur- 
poses of the United States during such occupation are set forth in 
General Orders, No. 101, of the War Department, of Julv 18, 1898, 
which was issued by direction of the President on capitidation of the 
Spanish forces at Santiago de Cid)aand in the eastern part of the prov- 



PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. O 

ince of Santiago, and the occupation of the territory by the forces of 
the United States. A copy of this order is hereto annexed for your 
information. 

As the evacuation of Cuba and the other Spanish islands in the West 
Indies by the Spanish military forces devolves upon the United States 
the duty of taking possession of and holding and preserving all the 
immovable property therein previously belonging to the Government of 
Spain, the evacuation commissioners of the United States are instructed 
to arrange for the taking into possession and to take into possession 
for the United States all public buildings and grounds, forts, fortifica- 
tions, arsenals, depots, docks, wharves, piers, and other fixed prop- 
erty previously belonging to Spain, and to arrange for the care and 
safe-keeping of such property under the authority and control of the 
United States. Small arms and accouterments, batteries and field 
artillery, supply and baggage wagons, ambulances, and other impedi- 
menta of the Spanish army in Cuba and other Spanish islands in the 
West Indies are to be removed, if desired, by the representatives of 
Spain, provided such removal shall be effected within a reasonable 
time; but the armament of forts, fortifications, and fixed batteries, 
being in the nature of immovable fixtures, are not to be allowed to be 
taken, but are, in connection with such forts, fortifications, and bat- 
teries, to be taken over into the possession of the United States. The 
instructions of the evacuation commissioners also contain appropriate 
clauses in regard to the custody and preservation by the United States 
of state papers, public records, and other papers and documents nec- 
essary or convenient for the government of the islands, as well as all 
judicial and legal documents and other public records necessary or 
convenient for securing to individuals the title to property. 

It will be proper to confirm these transactions by appropriate 
clauses in the treaty of peace. 

Similar clauses will be inserted in respect to the islands ceded to the 
United States in the Ladrones. This Government has selected the 
island of Guam, and you are instructed to embody in the treaty of 
peace a proper stipulation of cession. 

A rumor has reached us from various quarters to the effect that the 
Spanish peace commissioners will be instructed to claim compensa- 
tion for the public property of the Spanish Government in Cuba as 
well as in territories agreed to be ceded to the United States. This 
rumor is not credited, but it is proper to make a few observations 
upon it. No such claim on the part of the Spanish Goverimient is to 
be entertained in respect to any territory which Spain either cedes to 
the United States, or as to which she relinquishes her sovereignty and 
title. The cession of territory or the relinquishment of sovereignty 
over and title to it is universally understood to carr}^ with it the pub- 
lic property of the government by which the cession or relinquish- 
ment is made. Any claim therefore on the part of Spain, such as that 
above suggested, would be inconsistent with the express agreements 
embodied in the protocol. 

In the correspondence leading up to the signature of that instru- 
ment you will observe that this Government waived for the time being 
the requirement of a pecuniary indemnity from Spain. This conces- 
sion was made in the hope that Spain would thereby be enabled 
prompth" to accept our terms. But if the Spanish commissioners 
should, contrarj" to our just expectations, put forward and insist upon 



6 PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. 

a claim for compensation for public property, .you are instructed to 
put forward as a counterclaim a demand for an indemnity for the 
cost of the war. 

By article 6 of the protocol it was agreed that hostilities between 
the two countries should be suspended, and that notice to that effect 
should be given as soon as possible by each Government to the com- 
manders of its military and naval forces. Such notice was given by 
the Government of the United States inuiiediately after the signature 
of the protocol, the forms of the necessary orders having previously 
been prepared. But before notice could reach the commanders of 
the military and naval forces of the United States in the Philippines 
they captured and took possession by conquest of the city of Manila 
and its suburbs, which are therefore held by the United States by 
conquest as well as by virtue of the protocol. 

In view of what has taken place it is necessar^^ now to determine 
what shall be our future relations to the Philippines. Before giving 
you specific instructions on this subject it is my desire to present cer- 
tain general considerations. 

It is my wish that throughout the negotiations intrusted to the com- 
mission the purpose and spii-lt with which the United States accepted 
the unwelcome necessity of war should be kept constantly in view. 
We took up arms only in obedience to the dictates of humanity and in 
the fulfillment of high public and moral obligations. AVe had no design 
of aggrandizement and no ambition of conquest. Through the long 
course of repeated representations which preceded and aimed to avert 
the struggle and in the final arbitrament of force this country was 
impelled solely by the inirpose of relieving grievous wrongs and 
removing long-existing conditions which disturbed its tranquillity, 
which shocked the moral sense of mankind, and which could no longer 
be endured. 

It is my earnest wish that the United States in making peace should 
follow the same high rule of conduct which guided it in facing war. 
It should be as scrupulous and magnanimous in the concluding settle- 
ment as it was just and humane in its original action. The luster and 
the moral strength attaching to a cause which can be confidently rested 
upon the considerate judgment of the world shoukl not under any 
illusion of the hour be dinuued by ulterior designs which might tempt 
us into excessive demands or into an adventurous departure on untried 
paths. It is believed that the true glory and the enduring interests of 
country will most surely be served if an unselfish duty conscientiously 
accepted and a signal triumph honorably achieved shall be crowned 
by such an example of moderation, restraint, and reason in victory as 
best comports with the traditions and character of our enlightened 
Republic. 

Our aim in the adjustment of peace should l>e directed to lasting 
results and to the achievement of the common good under the demands 
of civilization rather than to ambitious designs. The terms of the 
protocol were framed upon this consideration. The abandonment of 
the Western Hemisphere by Spain was an imperative necessity. In 
presenting that requirement we only fulfilled a duty universally 
acknowledged. It involves no ungenerous reference to our recent foe, 
but simply a recognition of the plain teachings of history, to say that 
it was not compatible with the assurance of permanent peace on and 
near our own territorv that the Spanish flag should remain on this 



PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. 7 

side of the sea. This lesson of events jind of reason left no alternative 
as to Cuba, Porto Rico, and the other islands l)elonoino- to Spain in 
this hemisphere. 

The Philippines stand upon a diHerent basis. It is none the less 
true, however, that, without any orio-iiuil thought of complete or even 
partial acquisition, the presence and success of our arms at Manila 
imposes upon us obliyations which we can not disi-(>o-ard. The march 
of events rules and overrules human action. Avowing- unreservedly 
the purpose which has animated all our effort, and still solicitous to 
adhere to it, we can not be unmindful that without any desire or 
design on our part the war has brought us new duties and responsi- 
bilities which we must meet and discharge as liecomes a great nation 
on whose growth and career from the b(>ginning the Ruler of Nations 
has plainlv written the high eoumiand and pledge of civilization. 

Incidental to our tenure in the Philippines is the connucrcial oppor- 
tunity to which American statesmanship can not be indifferent. It is 
just to use every legitimate means for the enlargement of American 
trade; but we seek no advantages in the Orient which are not common 
to all. Asking- only the open door for ourselves, we are ready to 
accord the open door to others. The commercial opportunity which 
is naturally and inevitably associated with this new opening depends 
less on large territorial possessions than upon an adequate commercial 
basis and upon broad and equal privileges. 

It is believed that in the practical application of these guiding prin- 
ciples the present interests of our country and the proper measure ofits 
duty, its welfare in the future, and the consideration of its exemption 
from unknown perils will be found in full accord with the just, moral, 
and humane purpose which Avas invoked as our justification in accept- 
ing the war. 

In view of what has })een stated, the United States can not accept 
less than the cession in full right and sovereignty of the island ot 
Luzon. It is desirable, however, that the Tnited States shall acquire 
the right of entry for vessels and merchandise belonging- to citizens of 
the United States into such ports of the Philippines as are not ceded 
to the United States upon terms of equal favor with Spanish ships and 
merchandise, both in relation to port and customs charges and rates of 
trade and connnerce, together with other i-ights of protection and trade 
accorded to citizens of one country within the territory of another. 
You are therefore instructed to demand such concession, agreeing on 
your part that Spain shall have similar rights as to her subjects and 
vessels in the ports of anv territory in the Philippines ceded to the 
United States. 

We are informed that numerous persons are now held as prisoners 
by the Spanish Government for political acts performed in Cuba, 
Porto Rico, or other Spanish islands in the West Indies, as well as in 
the Philippines. You are instructed to demand the release of these 
prisoners so far as their acts have connection with matters involved in 
the settlement between the United States and Spain. 

It will be desirable to insert in any treaty of peace which you may 
conclude a stipulation for the revival of the provisions of our former 
treaties with Spain, so far as they may be applica))le to present 
conditions. 

I have directed Gen. Wesley Merritt, the late commander at Manila, 
to report to the Commission at Paris, where he will arrive October 2, 



8 PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. 

with such information as he may possess, and it is understood he will 
carr}^ with him, for the use of the Commission, the views of Admiral 
Dewey. To the views of these distinguished officers 1 invite the most 
careful consideration of the Commission. 

It is desired that your negotiations shall be conducted with all possible 
expedition in order that the treaty of peace, if you should succeed in 
making one, may be submitted to the Senate early in the ensuing ses- 
sion. Should you at any time in the course of your negotiations desire 
further instructions, you will ask for them without delay. 

William McKinley. 

Executive Mansion, 

Wasfungton^ Septeniher 16, 1898. 



August 27. 189S. 
Rear- Admiral Winfield Scott Schley, U. S. N. , 

Commissioner on the Part of the United States to 

Bupei'intend the Evacuation of Porto Pico. 
Sir: I inclose herewith, for your information, copies of two letters 
of instruction issued bj^ the President, on the 26th instant, to the com- 
missioners on the part of the United States to superintend the evacua- 
tion of Porto Rico. 

Respectfully, 3-ours, J. B. Moore, 

Acting Secretary. 



[Enclosure.] 



To Major-General Brooke, Rear-Admiral Schley, Brigadier-General Gordon, 
Commissioners on the Part of the United States to 

Supenntend the Evacuation of Porto Rico: 

By a protocol signed at Washington August 12, 1898, a copy of which is hereto 
annexed, the Governments of the United States and Spain agreed upon and defined 
the conditions on which they would enter upon negotiations for the establishment 
of peace between the two countries. 

Among the conditions thus agreed upon is the following: 

"Spain will cede to the United States the island of Porto Rico and other islands 
now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies." 

In order to give this stipulation effect it is agreed by Article IV of the protocol 
that Spain will, among other things, "immediately evacuate * * * Porto Rico 
and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies;" and to this 
end each Government engages within ten days after the signing of the protocol, to 
appoint commissioners, who shall, within thirty days after the signing of the pro- 
tocol, meet at San Juan, in Porto Rico, "for the purpose of arranging and carrying 
out the details of the aforesaid evacuation of Porto Rico and other islands now under 
Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies." 

The President has appointed you commissioners on the part of the United States 
to meet commissioners on the part of Spain at San Juan, for the purpose of arrang- 
ing and carrying out the details of the immediate evacuation of Porto Rico and other 
islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies, excluding Cuba and the 
adjacent Spanish islands, for the evacuation of which other commissioners have 
been appointed. 

You are therefore directed to proceed to San Juan at as early a day as practicable, 
in order that you may meet the commissioners on the part of Spain at the place and 
within the time designated. 

Your functions relate solely to "the evacuation" of Porto Rico and other islands 
now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies, with the exception above stated. 
The evacuation referred to is a military operation, and will, when carried into effect, 
leave the evacuated places in the military occupation, of the United States. Any 
questions not properly connected with this operation, such as may be involved in the 



PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. B' 

formal relinquiyhnient of sovereignty and title or cession of territory by Spain, are 
not within your powers, but must remain to be dealt with l)y the commissioners who 
are to meet at Paris under Article V of the protocol, for the jjurpose of negotiating 
and concluding a treaty of peace. 

The purposes and policy of this Government during the period of nulitary occupa- 
tion will not form a subject of negotiation between yourselves and the Spanish com- 
missioners, but they are set forth in General Order No. 101 of the War Department 
of July 18, 1898, which was issued by direction of the President on the capitulation 
of the Spanish forces at Santiago de Cuba and in the eastern })art of the province of 
Santiago and the occupation of the territory by the forces of the United States. A 
copy of this order is hereto annexed for your information and guidance. 

Your duties embiace both the arranging and the carrying out of the details of the 
evacuation. It will therefore be your duty to sui)ervise the execution of the details 
of the evacuation as well as to agree ujion them. 

By the terms of the protocol I'ortcj Rico is to l)e ceded by Spain to the United 
States. As such cession of the island will necessarily carry with it all the immovable 
property therein heretofore belonging to the Government of Spain, you will there- 
fore arrange for and take into possession for the United States all public buildings 
and grounds, forts, fortifications, arsenals, depots, docks, wharves, piers, and other 
fixed property heretofore belonging to Spain, and will arrange for the care and safe- 
keeping of the same as the property of the United States. 

The small arms and accouterments, l)atteries of field artillery, supi)ly and baggage 
wagons, ambulances, and other impedimenta of the Spanish army in Porto Rico you 
will permit to be removed, if desired, by the representatives of Spain, provided such 
removal shall be effected within a reasonable time. The armament of forts, fortifica- 
tions, and fixed batteries, being in the nature of immovable fixtures, will not be per- 
mitted to be taken, but will, in connection with said forts, fortifications, and batteries, 
be taken over by you into the possession of the United States. 

It will be your duty to see that all state papers, public records, and other papers 
and documeiits necessary or convenient for the government of the island, and records 
pertaining specially to the history of the island, be taken into your custody and pre- 
served as the pro]>erty of the United States. You will also provide that all judicial 
and legal documents and other public records necessary or convenient fcjr securing to 
individuals the titles to property shall also be saved and preserved. 

In taking over public property into the possession of the United States, you will 
have brief descrijjtions and full inventories made, and transmit the same to the Secre- 
tary of War, duly verified. 

You are authorized to allow such persons as may so desire, to depart from the 
islands in a peaceful and regular manner with their personal possessions. 

It will be your duty to confer with the general commanding the military forces 
in Porto Rico, from time to time, with reference to the details of the evacuation, and 
to arrange through the commancling general that the United States shall be pre{)ared 
to take possession of each city, town, place, or port, with a suitable garrison as fast 
as the Spanish forces evacuate the same. 

In like manner you will arrange, in connection with the connnanding-general, to- 
take charge of the custom-houses and other public buildings as the same are severally 
delivered over to the representatives of the United States. 

If in the course of your proceedings you desire further instructions on any particu- 
lar questions that may arise, you will submit without delay your request for such 
instructions. 

It is desired that your duties as conunissioners shall be performed with all possible 
expedition. 

Wi\r. McKixLEY. 

Executive Mansion, August 26, 1S9S. 

By the President : 

[great seal of united states.] J. B. Moore, 

Acting Secretary of State. 



[Confidential.] 

To Major-General Brooke, Rear- Admiral Schley, Brigadier-General Gordon, 
Cummissionerx on the part of the United States 

to superintend the evacuation of Porto Rico: 
In addition to the matters contained in your formal instructions herewith sub- 
mitted, your attention is hereby called to certain other matters relating not so much 
to the immediate evacuation by Spain of the islands as to the future control and gov- 



10 PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. 

ernment of the same by the United States, to which it is desired that you will pay 
such attention as opportunity may afford. 

You will bear in mind that Porto Rico and the other islands mentioned, except 
Cuba, are to become territory of the United States. Therefore all things done by 
you in the discharge of your commission should be done with a view to the future 
welfare of the islands and tlie improvement of the state and condition of their peo])le 
as dependencies of the United States. 

So far as it may come within the scope of your duties endeavor to arrange those 
matters within your jurisdiction so as to facilitate the speedy reestablishment of 
trade, commerce, business, and other peaceful pursuits of the inhabitants. 

You will need to become informed as to the police arrangements of each city and 
town and to be prepared to advise and assist the general in command of the island 
in the adoption and application of means to continue good order and the administra- 
tion of the local laws and ordinances after the departure of the Spanish forces. 

Where it can be done prudently, confer with the leading citizens of Porto Rico in 
an unofficial manner and endeavor to ascertain their sentiments of loyalty to the 
United States and their views as to such measures as they may deem necessary or 
important for the future welfare and good government of the island. 

In carrying out the details of the evacuation you will, so far as applicable and as 
will not conflict with your personal instructions, observe the principles contained 
in the instruction for government of armies of the United States in the field 
(G. O., 100). 

William McKinley. 

.Executive Mansion, 

Washington, Anguat 26, 1S98. 

By the President: 

[great seal of united states.] J. B. Moore, 

Acting Secretary of State. 



General Orders, ) War Department, 

>- Adjutant-General's Office, 

No. 101. ) W((s/i;,i(/fo7i, Jitly IS, 1898. 

The following, received from the President of the United States, is 
published for the information and guidance of all concerned: 

Executive Mansion, 

Washington, Juhj 13, 1898. 
To the Secretary of War. 

Sir: The capitulation of the Spanish forces in Santiago de Cuba and in the eastern 
part of the province of Santiago, and the occupation of the territory by the forces of the 
United States, render it necessary to instruct the military commander of the United 
States as to the conduct which he is to observe during the military occupation. 

The first effect of the military occupation-of the enemy's territory is the severance 
of the former political relations of the inhabitants and the establishment of a new 
political power. Under this changed condition of things the inhabitants, so long as 
they perform their duties, are entitled to security in their persons and property and 
in all their private rights and relations. It is my desire that the inhabitants of (Xiba 
should be acquainted with the purpose of the United States to discharge to the fullest 
extent its obligations in this regard. It will therefore be the duty of the commander 
of the army of occupation to announce and proclaim in the most public manner that 
we come not to make war upon the inhabitants of Cuba, nor upon any party or 
faction among them, but to protect them in their homes, in their employments, and 
in their personal and religious rights. All persons who, either by active aid or by 
honest submission, cooperate with the United States in its efforts to give effect to this 
beneficent purpose will receive the reward of its supi^ort and protection. Our occu- 
pation should be as free from severity as possible. 

Though the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme and 
immediately operate upon the political condition of the inhabitants, the municipal 
laws of the conquered territory, such as affect private rights of person and property 
and provide for the punishment of crime, are considered as continuing in force, so 
far as they are compatible with the new order of things, until they are suspended 
or superseded by the occupying belligerent, and in practice they are not usually 
abrogated, but are allowed to remain in force and to be administered by the ordi- 
nary tribunals, substantially as they were before the occupation. This enlightened 



PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. 11 

j)ractice is, so I'iir as possible, to be adhered to on tlie i)resent occasion. Tlie judjies 
and the other officials connected with the administration of jnstice may, if they 
accept the snpreniacy of the United States, continues to administer the ordinary law 
of the land, as between man and man, under the snjx'rvision of the American com- 
mander in chief. The native constabulary will, so far as may be practicable, be 
preserved. The freedom of the peoi)le to i)ursue their accustomed occupations will 
beal)ridge<l only when it may be necessary to do so. 

While the rule of conduct of the American connnander in chief will be such as 
has just been defined, it will be his duty to adopt measures of a different kind, if, 
unfortunately, the course of the people should render such measures indispensable 
to the maintenance of law and order. He will then ])ossess the jiower to replace or 
exi)el the native officials in part or altogether, to substitute new courts of his own con- 
stitution for those that now exist, or to create such new or sui)])lementary tribunals 
as may be necessary. In the exercise of these high powers the connnander nmst be 
guided by his judgment and his experience and a high sense of justice. 

One of the most important and most jjractical problems with which it will be 
necessary to deal is that of the treatment of property and the collection and adminis- 
tration of the revenues. It is coixceded that all public funds and securities belong- 
ing to the government of the country in its own right, and all arms and sup]>lies and 
other movable })roperty of such government, may be seized by the military occu- 
pant and converte(l to his own use. The real property of the state he may hold 
and administer, at the same time enjoying the revemies thereof, but he is not 
to destroy it save in the case of military necessity. All pul)lic means of transporta- 
tion, such as telegraph lines, cables, railways and boats belonging to the state may 
l)e appropriated to his use, but unless in case of military necessity they are not to be 
destroyed. All churches and l^uildings devoted to religious worship and to the arts 
and sciences, all schoolhouses, are, so far as possible, to be i>rotecte<l, and all destruc- 
tion or intentional defacement of such places,, of historical monujnents or archives, 
or of works of science or art, is prohibited, save when required by urgent nWitary 
necessity. 

Private property, whether l)elonging to individuals or corporations, is to be 
resi)ecte<l, and can be confiscated only for cause. Means of transportation, such as 
telegraph lines and cables, railways and boats, mav, although they belong to private 
individuals or corporations, be seized by the military occupant, V)ut unless destroyed 
under military necessity are not to be retained. 

While it is held to be the right of the conqueror to levy contributions upon the 
enemy in their seaports, towns, or provinces wdiich may be in his military ])osses- 
sion by conquest, and toapjily the jtroceeds to defray the expenses of the war, this 
riglit is to be exerci.sed within such limitations that it may not savor of confiscation. 
As the result of military occupation the taxes and duties payable by the inhabi- 
tants to the former government become ]myable to the military occupant, unless 
he sees fit to substitute for them other rates or modes of contril)ution to the expenses 
of the government. The moneys so collected are to be used for the purpose of pay- 
ing the expenses of government under the military occupation, such as the salaries 
of the judges and the police, and for the payment of the expenses of the army. 

Private i)roperty taken for the use of the army is to be paid for when possible in 
cash at a fair valuation, and when payment in cash is not possible, receipts are to 
be given. 

All ports and places in Cuba which may be in the actual possession of our land 
and naval forces will be opened to the commerce of all neutral nations, as well as 
our own, in articles not contraband of war, upon payment of the prescribed rates of 
duty which may be in force at the time of the importation. 

Wn.LIAM ]\IcKlNLEY. 

By order of the Secretary of War: 

H. C. CoRBiN, Adjiitani-driicrdl. 



Washington, August 27, 1898. 
Rear- Admiral William T. Sampson, U. S. N., 

C<»i}vi!>t.sfonrr on the Part of the Ignited States 

to Siqyerlntend the Evacuation of Cuba. 
Sir: 1 inclose herewith for j'our information copies of two letters of 
instruction issued bv the President on the 26th instant to the commis- 



12 PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. 

sioners on the part of the United States to superintend the evacuation 
of Cuba. 

Respectfully 3"ours, 

J. B. Moore, 

Acting Secretary. 

[Enclosure.] 

To Major-General Wade, Rear-Admiral Sampson, Major-General Butler, 

Commissioners on the Part of the United States to Superintend the Evacuation of Cuba: 

By a protocol signed at Washington August 12, 1898, a copy of which is hereto 
annexed, the Governments of the United States and Spain agreed upon and defined 
the conditions on which they would enter upon negotiations for the establishment 
of peace between the two countries. 

Among the conditions agreed upon is the following: 

"Spain will relinquish all claim of sovereignty over and title to Guba." 

In order to give effect to this and other stipulations of the protocol, it is agreed by 
Article IV that Spain will, among other things, immediately evacuate Cuba, Porto 
Rico, and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies; and to 
this end each Government agrees, within ten days after the signing of the protocol, to 
appoint commissioners, who shall, within thirty Vlays after the signing of the protocol, 
meet at Habana, "for the purpose of arranging and carrying out the details of the 
aforesaid evacuation of Cuba and the adjacent Spanish islands," while other commis- 
sioners are to meet at San Juan, Porto Rico, for the purpose of arranging and carrying 
out the details of the "evacuation of Porto Rico and other islands now under Spanish 
sovereignty in the West Indies." 

The President has appointed you commissioners on the part of the United States 
to meet commissioners on the part of Spain at Habana, for the purpose of arranging 
and carrying out the details of the immediate evacuation of Cuba and the adjacent 
Spanish islands. 

You are therefore directed to proceed to Habana at as early a day as practicable, 
in orrler that you may meet the commissioners on the part of Spain at the place and 
within the time designated. 

The evacuation referred to is a military operation and will when carried into effect 
leave the evacuated places in the military occupation of the United States. 

The purposes and policy of this Government during the period of military occupa- 
tion will not form the subject of negotiations between yourselves and the Spanish 
commissioners; but they are set forth in General Orders No. 101 of the War Depart- 
ment of July 18, 1898, which was issued by direction of the President on the capit- 
ulation of the Spanish forces at Santiago de Cuba and in the eastern part of the 
Province of Santiago and the occupation of the territory by the forces of the United 
States. A copy of this order is hereto annexed for your information and guidance. 

Your duties embrace both the arranging and carrying out of the details of the 
evacuation. It will therefore be your duty to supervise the execution of the details 
of the evacuation as well as to agree upon them. 

The evacuation of Cuba and the adjacent Spanish islands by the Spanish military 
forces will devolve upon the United States the duty of taking possession, holding, 
and preserving all the immovable property therein heretofore belonging to the Gov- 
ernment of Spain. You will therefore arrange for and take into possession for the 
United States all ])ublic buildings and grounds, forts, fortifications, arsenals, depots, 
docks, wharves, piers, and other fixed property heretofore belonging to Spain, and 
will arrange for the care and safe-keeping of the same under the authority and con- 
trol of the United States. 

The small arms and accouterments, batteries of field artillery, supply and baggage 
wagons, ambulances, and other impedimenta of the Spanish army in Cuba and the 
adjacent Spanish islands you will permit to be removed, if desired, by the represen- 
tatives of Spain, provided such removal shall be effected within a reasonable time. 
The armament of forts, fortifications, and fixed liatteries, loeing in the nature of 
immovable fixtures, will not be permitted to be taken, but will, in connection with 
said forts, fortifications, and batteries, be taken over by you into the possession of 
the United States. 

It will be your duty to see that all state papers, public records, and other papers 
and documents necessary or convenient for the goverftment of the islands and 
records pertaining specially to their history be taken into your custody and preserved 



PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. 13 

for the future use of such goverunient as nia\' he estahhshed thereiu. You will also 
provide that all judicial and legal documents and other public records necessary or 
convenient for securing to individuals the titles to property shall also l^e saved and 
preserved. 

In taking over public property into the possession of the United States you will 
have brief descriptions and full inventories made and transmit the same to the Sec- 
retary of War, duly verified. 

You are authorized to allow such persons as may (so) desire to depart from the 
islands in a ix'aceful and regular manner with their personal possessions. 

It will be your duty to confer with the general commanding the military forces in 
Cuba and the a<ljacent Spanish islands from time to time, with reference to the details 
of the evacuation, and to arrange through the commanding general that the United 
States shall be prejiared to take possession of each city, town, place, or port with a 
suitable garrison as fast as the Spanish forces evacuate the same. 

In like manner you will arrange in connection with the commanding general to 
take charge of the custom-houses and other public l)uildings as the same are severally 
delivered over to the representatives of the United States. 

If in the course of your proceedings you desire further instructions on any partic- 
ular questions that may arise, you will submit without delay your request for such 
instructions. 

It is desired that your duties as commissioners shall be performed with all possiV)le 
expedition. 

William McKixley. 

Executive Mansion, Washington, AikjiisI 26, 1898. 

By the President: 

[great seal of united states.] J. B. Moore, 

Acting Secretary of State. 



[Confidential.] 

To Major-General Waoe, Rear-Adiniral Sampson, Major-General Butler, 

Commissioners on the Part of the United States to Superintend the Evacuation of Cuba: 

In addition to the matters contained in your formal instructions herewith submit- 
teii, your attention is herel)y called to certain other matters relating not so much to 
the immediate evacuation by Spain of the islands in question as to their future con- 
trol and government t)y the'United States, to which it is desired that you will pay 
such attention as oi)portunity may afford. 

So far as it may come within the scope of your duties you will endeavor to arrange 
those matters within your jurisdiction so as to facilitate the speedy reestablishment 
of trade, commerce, business, and other peaceful pursuits of the inhabitants. 

You will need to liecome informed as to the police arrangements of each city and 
town and to l)e prepared to advise and assist the general in command of the islands 
in question in the adoption and application of means to continue good order and the 
administration of the local laws and ordinances after the departure of the Spanish 
forces. 

Where it can l)e done prudently, confer with the leading citizens of Cuba and the 
adjacent Spanish islands in an unofficial manner and endeavor to ascertain their sen- 
timents toward the United States, and their views as to such measures as they may 
deem necessary or important for the future welfare and good government of the islands. 

In carrying out the details of the evacuation you will, so far as ajiplicable and as 
will not conflict with your personal instructions, observe the princi})les contained in 
the Instruction for Government of Armies of the United States in the Field ( G. O. , 100) . 

William IVIcKinley. 

Executive Mansion, 

Washi7igton, August 26, 1898. 

By the President: 

J. B. ]MooKE, Acting Secretarg of State. 

[seal.] 



14 PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. 

Mr. Day to the President. 

[Telegram.] 

Paris, Septemher '28, 1898. 
Commission send greetings. All well and preparing for meeting 
on Saturday. Spanish commissioners are here. Minister of foreign 
affairs entertains our body, also Spanish commissioners, on Thursday 
morning at breakfast. Are advised that (Teneral Merritt will arrive 
on Sunday at London. General Bates advises us that he is ordered to 
report here Monday next. It is sense of commission that, in view of 
the arrival of General Merritt, Secretary of War had better order 
General Bates not to come here until requested h\ conuuission. 

Day. 



The Presidtnt to Mr. Day. 

[Telegram.] 

Washington, Septemher 29., 1898. 
Present my congratulations to the commissioners upon their safe 
arrival in good health, and the auspicious beginning of their impor- 
tant work. 

William McKinley. 



The President to Mr. Day. 

[Telegram.] 

Washington, September 28, 1898. 
The order will be issued. General Greene has just arrived and had 
long talk with him. He is thoroughly well informed. If 5'ou care to 
have him, will direct him to report to you. 

William McKinlp^y. 



2fr. Day to the PresJdoit. 

[Telegram.] 

Paris, September 28,1898. 
Commission presented to minister for foreign affairs yesterday. 
Will communicate as to General Greene after we have seen General 
Merritt, unless you wish to send him at once. 

Day. 



The President to Mr. Day. 

[Telegram.] 

Washington, September 28, 1898. 
Will await request of commission before sending General Greene. 
Merritt will have note from Dewey. 

William McKinley, 



PAPKRR RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. 15 

Mr. I)((ij to th<' President. 

[TL'k'gram.] 

Paiiis, Sej>fr}nher 30, 1S98. 
Minister for foreign atiair.s oav(> joint entertainment yesterday to 
the two commissions; passed oft' ver}' ag-reeably. Meet for business 
to-morrow. Commissioners will be presented to the President of France 
on Tuesday. Can 3'ou send word of gnu^ting to him to be delivered 
at our presentation^ 

Day. 



The Preslderd to Mr. Day. 

[Telegram.] 

Washington, Septeuiher 30, 1S98. 

Answering your telegram of to-day, I request you to deliver to 
President of the Republic, on the occasion of your presentation, the 
following message in my name: 

His Excellency Felix Faure, 

President of the French Republic, Paris: 
On this occasion, when the commissioners of the United States and Spain are about 
to assemble in the capital of France to negotiate peace, and when the representatives 
of this Government are receiving the hospitality and good will of the Republic, I beg 
to tender to you a most friendly personal greeting and the assurances of my grateful 
appreciation of your kind courtesies to the American commissioners. 

William McKinley, 
President of the United States. 



M/\ Dinj to the President. 

[Telegram.] 

Paris, Oetoher i, IHDR. 
At our iirst meeting to-day the Spanish Commissioners by instruc- 
tion of their Government ])resented as })reliminarv to any discussion 
of a treaty a written communication basing on Aiiich^ VI of the pro- 
tocol a demand that the American commission join them in declaring 
that the status quo in the Philppine Islands existing at the time of the 
signing of the protocol must be immediately restored by the con- 
tracting party that may have altered it or have consented or failed to 
prevent its alteration to the prejudice of the other. Spanish commu- 
nication represents that status quo has been altered and continues to 
be altered to prejudice of Spain by Tagalo rebels, whom it descrit)es as 
an auxiliary force to the regular American troops, and demands that 
commissioners jointly declare that American authorities in Phili})})ine 
Islands nmst at once proceed completely to restore status quo in terri- 
tories they occupy and refrain from preventing restoration thereof by 
Spain in territory not occupied by United States. Spanish commis- 
sioners ask for an answer on Monday next. We propose to reply that 
these demands having been presented to the Government of the United 
States were answered by notes of the Department of State to French 
embassy of September 5 and 16, and that any further demands as to 



16 PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. 

military operations in the Philippine Islands must be addressed to 
Government at Washington and consequently that we can not joiujin 
the proposed declarations. We await instructions. 

Day. 



Mr. Day to Mr. Hay. 

[Telegram.] 

To Secretary of State: 

Our answer submitted to Spanish commissioners declining to join 
in declarations as to restoration status quo in Philippine Islands on 
grounds stated in our telegram October 1st well received by them. 
We then submitted articles of the treaty covering Cuba, Porto Rico, 
and other islands in West Indies and Guam, as provided in protocol. 
They asked until Friday to consider them. Adjourned to Friday 
afternoon. Hear Merritt to-morrow. 

Day. 



Mr. Day to Mr. Hay. 

[Telegram.] 

No. 2. J Paris, Octoher J^, 1898— m. 51 j)- m. 

The opinions of Admiral Dewe3% in the possession of the Commis- 
sion, seem to favor retention of Luzon alone, but appear to have been 
given in answer to question as to which island in Philippine Islands 
the United States should retain. If this assumption is correct, will 
you, if it is deemed advisa])le, as certain by telegraph through proper 
channel, and telegraph us whether Admiral has formed an opinion, 
and if so what (it) is on the question whether it would be better for 
United States to retain Luzon, and perhaps one or two small adjacent 
islands, or the whole group. 

Day. 



The President of France to the President. 

[Telegram.] 

Paris, Octoher ^, 1898. 
I have had great pleasure in receiving the American Plenipoten- 
tiaries of the Spanish-American Peace Commission. During the audi- 
ence Mr. Day read me the telegram which yow had the kindness to send 
me. I am much touched at the sentiment which Your Excellency has 
had the goodness to express in respect to me, and I thank you verj" 
much. I hope that the American Commissioners will have a pleasant 
memory of their sta}' in Paris, and I will do my best to make it 
agreeable. I sincerely trust that the peaceful work of the commission 
will come to a happy conclusion. 

Felix Faure. 



PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. 17 

.Vr. Ildij to Mr. Ddij. 

[Telegram. J 

Department op State, 

Wdx/i/iK/foti. October 5, 1898. 

(Sent 12.45 p. iii.) 
The President on the i;^)th Augu.st I'cqiiested Dewey's opinion on 
relative desirableness of the several islands, to which he made l)rief 
reply ))y cable which you have seen. Later the President asked him 
to communicate to Merritt his views on general question of Philip- 
pines. His report in your hands is in response to })oth questions. 

Hay. 



Mr. Hay to Jlr. Day. 

[Telegram.] 

Department of State, 

Wa^h!))r/to)). Ortoh-r 6, J89S. 
(Sent 4 p. m.) 
The following telegram has been received here from the chairman 
of the American commissioners in (\iV)a: 

Havana, October 5, J898. 

Joint session of commissions de-veloped irreconcilable differences, Spanish com- 
mission under instructions from their Government holding, first, that Spanish sov- 
ereignty will remain paramount in Cuba until Spain, in treaty about being negoti- 
ated in Paris, has relinquisheil the same and treaty has been concluded, ratified, and 
proclaimed. 

Second. When Spain has relinquished sovereignty in the manner just stated, then 
so much of fourth article as provides for immediate evacuation becomes effective; 
that this evacuation is solely a military operation. 

Third. That dates originally given hy them under which evacuation is to be com- 
l)leted, April 1, next year, are l)y them adhered to. 

Fourth. That rule of capture does not apply to territory now occupied ]>y Spanish 
troops; that they are therefore permitted to take with them not only alf movable 
property, but also all guns and their mountings from fortifications, and fixed bat- 
teries as well as machinery from navy-yards and arsenals — in fact, everything of 
material of war which can l)e moved. We ha\'e dissented from all of these proposi- 
tions, holding, first, that under terms of protocol relinquishment of sovereignty is a 
condition prei-edent to negotiations for peace at Paris. 

Second. That, under protocol, article fourth became effective on its date, August 12; 
that the term ''to evacuate" is not restricted in its nieaning as used in the protocol 
to a military evacuation, and that to immediately evacuate means to at once abandon 
possession of by withdrawing from the country not only the military but also the 
(iovernment authority of Sj^ain. 

Third. That we insist upon Deceml)er 1, next, as date for concluding evacuation by 
Spanish troops. 

Fourth. That under Spanish law all movable things constructed or destined for 
the permanent use or service of immoval)le property become innnovable property; 
that fortifications and fixed batteries are innnovable property; that, therefore, guns 
and their mountings and other things intended for pennanent use or service of such 
fortifications are necessarily fixtures, and hence inmiovaljle property, and likewise 
machinery and other like fixtures in navy-yard or arsenal. 

Spanish conunission all made point that surrender of sovereignty at various points 
at various times would cause confusion in matter of tariff and in collecting internal (?) 
and other duties. 

We replied we had considered that subject and were prepared to assume responsi- 
bility for proper collections when our troops occupy island. 

Spanish commission has appealed to Madrid for instructions upon points stated. 
We submit foregoing differences for your actinn and further instructions. Spanish 

S. Doc. 148 2 



18 PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. 

commission have heretofore assured us that within period b\' them stated they will 
proceed as rapiiUy wdth the eiidjarkation of their troops as circumstances and facili- 
ties will permit, and they stated to-day that up to this time they are promised 27 ships, 
most of them on the way. 

Wadk, ( 'li(iiriii(iii. 

To this the President made the followiiio- reply: 
Wade, Hahaiia: 

Your messafie of ()ctol)er ."i givinjr the differences between the S])anish commis- 
sioners and yourselves is received. Their claims are wholly inadmissible, and yours 
are in strict accordance with the ]irotocol and the instructions hi'retofore jriven, and 
must be adhered to. 

Wii i.iA.M M(Ki.\j,i-:v. 

Hay. 



Mr. Ihnj in Mr. l/<ii/. 



No. 3. Paris. Ortohrr 7\ 1S!)S. 

(Received 7.^6 a. ni.) 

(Teiieni! Morritt l»riii<>s statements from (leiieral (rreeiie. Suro'eoii 
Bourns, Major Boll. Admiral Dewcv. Colonel Jewett, personal opin- 
ions of Belgian Consul Andre at Manila, and correspondence of our 
military officers with Aoiiinaldo. Needless to sunnnarize the state- 
ment of Greene, who is in Washinoton. Bourns several years in the 
Philippine Islands, and opinion nuich relied on by Merritt. Thinks if 
a few ambitious insurtj-ent chieftains coidd be disp(>;ed of. masses of 
nati\es could l>e manaoed by the Ignited States. Considers natives 
incapable of self-oovernment because of lack of o-ood exam})les, lack 
of union in Luzon and throuohout archipelaoo. und existence of race, 
tribal, and religious tliflerences. Natives united aoainst Spain. Strong 
feeling against monastic orders, but notagaiiist church itself. Natives 
in Luzon are Catholics and well disposed t<jward the flesuits. 

Islands as whole rich and producti\'e: climate good as any in Tropics. 
Major Bell estimates insurgent forces upward 20,000. Aguinaldo 
the most popular leader, but maintains control with difficulty. Some 
of his leading men dishonest and many wealthy natives opposed to 
him. Natives of Manila generally opposed to insurrection. Petty 
chiefs get money by blackmail and booty. Aguinaldo and his lead- 
ers will resist any attempt to reorganize a colonial government, but 
want native republic under American or other protectorate except 
Spanish. 

Admiral Dewey sends only copy of report sent to President by 
Greene. 

C'olonel Jewett thiidvs nati\es would submit to any just, tirm gov- 
ernment, but unfit for self-government. Insurrection did not aim at 
national independence. Spain can not in near future protect life and 
property in Luzon, nor could insurrectionary government sustain 
itself there. United States territorial fonn of government not practi- 
cable at present. 

Belgian con.sul. according to Merritt — who gives nuich weight to his 
opinion — is intelligent man. wealthy, and largely interested in business, 
and discloses business man's point of view. Consul says Cnited States 
nnist take all or nothing. If southern islands remained with Spain 



PAPERS RELATINi; TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. 19 

they would he iji constant revolt und I'nited States would have a second 
Cuba. Spanish Government would not improve. Power and cor- 
ruptions of ottice holders would contiiui(\ Spanish tjj-overnors would 
still protect monks in their extortions. Insurrection began among 
lower classes, who make good soldiers. Since ari'ival of American 
forces certain members of native upper classes ha\e joined rebels. 
Native character insincere. Upper classes include usurers, pawn- 
Ijrokers. and keepers of gambling houses, who will not risk their 
capital in rebellion and who would be glad to have American pro- 
tection against insurgent demands for money. Rich natives treat 
laborers inhumanly. Custom on plantations all over islands is to get 
workmen into debt and then hold them practically as slaves and even 
transfer them with estates. Spanish (xovernment always tolerated 
and protected this system. 

Enormous dili'erence between even best educated natives and white 
men. Chinese natives join sordidness to craftiness, and are rapacious 
pawnbrokers. Spanish natives join presumption to duplicity. On 
(the) whole, natives inferior and untitted to rul«\ Their only example 
the monks and Spaniards. United States should have pity on them 
(and) show them something better. Under United States islands would 
increase in wealth and soon return any money laid out. Even Spanish 
merchants desire American protection. Natives do not desire inde- 
pendence. Present reliellion represents only half of one per centum 
of inhabitants. Only 30,000 rebels. Luzon only partly held (by) them. 
The monks want to get away. Natives will I'esist Spaniards, but 
submit to United States. 

(General Anderson, in correspondence with Aguinaldo in .June and 
Juh', seemed to treat him and his forces as allies and native authori- 
ties, but sul)sequently changed his tone. General Merritt reports that 
Admiral Dewey did not approve this correspondence and advised 
against it. Merritt and Dewey both kept clear of any compromising 
communications. Merritt expresses opinion we are in no way com- 
mitted to any insurgent programme. 

Answering questions of Judge Day, General Merritt said insurrec- 
tion practically confined to Luzon. Tribal and religious differences 
between the inhabitants of various islands. United States has helped 
rather than injured insurrection. Under no obligation other than 
moral to h«dp natives. Natives of Luzon would not accept Spanish 
rule, even with amnesty. Insurgents would l)e victorious unless 
Spaniards did better in future than in past. Insurgents would tight 
among themselves if they had no common enemy. Think it feasible 
for United States to take Luzon and perhaps some adjacent islands 
and hold them as England does her colonies. Natives could not resist 
5.OO0 troops. 

Revenues of Luzon, leaving out cock lighting, gambling licenses, 
and poll tax, would more than pay expenses of government. No bur- 
den of any kind on United States, and we would help th(^ island. 
Chinese half-breeds the most enterprising element in the islands. 
Thinks we hold Manila by conquest, and that the proctocol did not 
affect the capitulation. He considered that the surrender was virtually 
a surrender of the Philippine Islands. He thinks it practicable and 
unobjectionable to hold Luzon alone, where most of the rebellious feel- 
ing exists. He knows, however, little of conditions in other islands. 
It would require more to take and keep whole group than Luzon. 



20 PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. 

Horrible stories told of monastic orders which hold most of land in 
the island and oppress native tenants. Friars want United States to 
ti'ansport them to Hon<>-konsi-. No relioious tolerance in the islands. 
Hundreds, perhaps thousands, of priests in Luzon. The United 
States raig-ht have conflicts with the church, but not with the people. 

Answering- questions of Senator Davis, Merritt said sevei'al million 
dollars fell into American hands on capitulation of Manila. Spanish 
authorities extorted -i^2,U0O,U0O from ])ank in March and never repaid 
it. Probably spent this money or carried it away before the capitula- 
tion. Friars are mostly imported Spaniards. Native priests are popu- 
lar, and pro])a])ly in sympathy with insuro-ents. Filipinos treated 
prisoners well, but did not feed them well: this was unnecessary. The 
natixes he has seen in Manila, capal)le of assisting- the United States in 
governing-, could be num})ered on his lingers, but the munber mig-ht 
increase. So far they had had no training. 

The islands lying between Luzon and Mindanao dependent more or 
less strategically and commercially on Luzon. This (is) his under- 
standing, but he did not give much attention to the subject and his 
opinion not \aluable. ]Manila the distributing center. Had not given 
consideration to the place at which S])ain would set up her power if 
we took Luzon. Spain might go\-ern othei- islands if she did not con- 
tinue abuses, (ieneral Merritt thinks that if L'nited States attempted 
to take possession of Luzon, or all the group as a colony, Aguinaldo 
and his inmiediate followers would resist it, but his forces are divided 
and his opposition would not amount to anything. If the islands were 
divided, rilibustering- expeditions might go from one island to another, 
thus exposing us to constant danger of conflict with Spain. 

In answer to (juestions of Senator Frye, Merritt said insurg-ents 
would nuirder Spaniards and pri(\sts in Luzon and destroy their prop- 
erty if the United States withdrew. United States undei- moral obli- 
gation to stay there. He did not know whether the effect of setting- 
up a govei'nment by the United States in Luzon would be to produce 
revolutions in other islands. It might cause reforms in their g-overn- 
uient. Some of the revolutionary leaders in Luzon might try to stir 
up rebellion in the other islands, but it would be difficult for them to 
tit out expeditions without our knowledge. There would be danger 
between the United States and Spain, as there is between Germany 
and France over Alsace-Lorraine — Spain would want to recover what 
she had lost. Would not say that the United States should taki; all or 
none. Thought United States could not abandon Luzon. It would 
simplify things if United States took whole group, but whether it is 
not a larger undertaking- than we choose to have on our hands is a 
(|uestion in his mind, and if there was a way of compromising it by 
holding on to Luzon and such other contig-uous islands as we desire, 
thinks it would be wise to do it. Would have no confidence in Spanish 
guarantees. 

Answering- questions of Mr. Gray. Merritt said consequences in 
case of either insurgent or Spanish triumph made it doubtful whether 
United States Avould be morally justified in withdrawing. Our acts 
were ordinary acts of war, as if we had attacked Barcelona, but pres- 
ent conditions in Philippine Islands were partly brought about by us. 
Insurgents not in worse condition by our coming, Spaniards hardly 
aide to defend themselves. If we restored them to their position and 



PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. 21 

trenches, they might maintain themselves ^vith the help of a navy 
when we withdrew. Did not know that he could make out a r(\spon- 
sibility by argument, but he felt it. It might be sentimental. He 
thought it would l)e an advantage if the United States would change 
its policy and keep the islands. (He) thought our interests in the East 
would be helped by the cheap lal)or in the Philippines, costing only 
from 20 to 80 cents a day. according to skill. United States might 
hold Luzon alone, but it would rec|uire larger force to protect Luzon 
if other powers held other islands, though it would require a larg-er 
force to protect all the islands than to protect Luzon. Thought we 
could manage the religious question, but it would ])e unwise to let 
Protestant missionaries go there except as educatoi's, and that not 
inuuediately. 

Answering questions of Mr. Reid. Merritt said he considered cap- 
ture of Manila practically capture of group. Nothing left of Spanish 
sovereignty that was not at mercy of the United States. Did not think 
our humanity bounded by geographical lines. After Dewey's victory 
we armed insurgents to some extent, but Dewey says it was over- 
estimated. Insurgents bought arms from Hongkong merchants with 
Dewey's cognizance, but Dewey was not in favor of allowing this to 
continue. Spaniards would destroy Aguinaldo and his principal fol- 
lowers, if allowed to do so. Spanish guaranties worthless unless 
enforced by bayonet. To take Luzon alone would expose us to Spain's 
efforts to recover what she had lost. If disorders broke out in other 
islands either through Spanish misgovernment or through attempt to 
sell to other countries, the effect upon our possessions in Luzon would 
l^e disasti'ous. 

Prosperity of Manila has arisen partly from its being the capital 
and entrepot of the group. If we took Luzon alone and powerful 
European countries got other islands the trade would be deflected 
from Manila. A strong power holding Cebu or Iloilo wT)uld develop 
it at expense of Manila. Manila would become less valuable, but even 
in this case he thinks revenues would be sufficient to pay all expense 
of administration, including army and navy. Revenue of whole 
group would be more than adequate for government. Native forces 
might be used for military purposes if recruited about a nucleus of a 
regiment or two of our own troops. Natives glad to serve in army 
and could undoubtedly l)e depended on. A military government, fol- 
lowing the English examples of utilizing natives as far as possible, 
would be best for the present. 

Answering Judge Day. Merritt said he had no knowledge of how 
natives outside Luzon would act toward United States. Thinks Luzon 
would be self-sustaining, except in case of foreign interference, but 
even then would be self-supporting. 

Answering Senator Gray. Merritt said he thought the natural 
advantages would cause commerce to fiow through its accustomed 
channels. It would be better for the other islands and Luzon to be 
in the possession of a highly civilized power than to remain in their 
present condition. The capitulation of ^Manila on file in the War 
Department was made a part of General Merritt's statement. 

Thursdav, 10 a. m. 

Day. 



22 PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. 

J//'. Day to Ml'. Ihiy. 

[Telegram.] 

No- ^-J I'ARis. October 7, 1898. (Received 1.05 p. m.) 

Telegram coiieernino- difficulties of commissioners at Habana received. 
Our coiDinissioners seem to have made mistake in discussing or answer- 
ing anv question as to Spain's relinquishment of sovereignty over 
and title to CJuba. Their duties relate solelv to that practical niilitary 
operation of immediate evacuation. It seems to us they should have 
said this, instead of accepting an issue as to the time Vhen Spanish 
sovereignty will be relinquished. Not of vital importance when Spain 
formally relinquishes her sovereignty, or whether she ever formally 
relinquishes it, if we are in possession. This was specitic purpose o"f 
article 4 of protocol. 

We meet Spanish commissioners this afternoon and shall go forward 
with articles as to ('u})a, Porto Kico, and Guam without mentioning 
(|uestions fx'fore commissioners at Habana. 

Day. 

J//', lliiii io Mr. Ddij. 

[Telegram.] 

Depaktment of State. 

AVii^^JiiiKltoiu Oitohr 7, 1898. 
Your No. 4 received and is satisfactory to the President. It was 
not to have you open the question which you have properly regarded 
as closed, but to have you assist if possible in the carrvingout of the 
terms settled by the protocol, to wit: The immediate evacuation of 
Cuba, Porto Rico, and the other islands of the West Indies. The 
evacuation commissioners have not so far as we are advised discussed 
the relin((uishment of title and sovereigntv in Cuba and Porto Rico on 
part of Spain; that was settled by the protocol. Thev have discussed 
only the details of evacuation. Your proposal to go forward without 
mentioning questions before commissioners at Habana is approved bv 
the President. 

Hay. 



Tlw Pr,s!<l„Ht tn Mr. Day. 

[Telegnim.] 

Executive Mansion, 

Washington, Octoher 7, 1898. 
There are still ;},500 Spanish troops in Porto Rico. No transports 
have been provided to carry them to Spain. Longer delay can not be 
permitted. Can you hasten transports^ If troops can not be moved 
away on or before October 18, then, on that day, possession should be- 
given to the American evacuation commission" and notice should be 
so served. Whatever help the American peace commission can give 
in this direction should be given. The Cuban commissioners are*evi- 
dently intent upon delay, and thev have been notilied that the e vacua 
tion must be completed by the 1st of December. 

WlLLIA3I McKiNLEY. 



PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. 23 

Mr. Ddij to tha Pn^s/dent. 

[Telfgram.] 

No. 5.] Paris, Octoher 7, 189S. 

Telegraiu rot-eived. In view of the iiiiswer made by us on Monday- 
last [No. 1] with your approval to Spanish proposition as to status (juo 
in Philippines, we think we are precluded from presenting to Spanish 
commissioners here any question properly belonging to two Govern- 
ments or to the commissioners at Habana or San Juan. It would open 
to them a door which by our answ'ei- of Monday we hoped we had 

closed tinallv. 

Day. 



J//'. Day to J//'. ILn/. 

[Telegram.] 

No. (•».] Paris, Octoljer S, 1898— 11. -m^ a. ///. 

Your ve\)\y to our telegram as to Habana commissioners received. 
As we read telegram of Wade to Adjutant-General it seems clear that 
our Cuban commissioners undertook to discuss (juestion of relinquish- 
ment of title and sovereignty and ad^•anced a proposition in relation 
thereto. We understood the protocol and their instructions to restrict 
them to the military operation of evacuation, which was to leave evacu- 
ated places in military occupation of United States. We understand 
that questions as to relincpiishment of title and sovereignty are com- 
mitted to us. 

Day. 



Mr. Hay to Mr. Day. 

[Telegram.] 

Department of State, 

WaHhlngton. Octoher 8, 1898. 
Your No. (') received. The President does not understand that our 
commissioners in Cuba have undertaken such discussion as you men- 
tion. But as a measure of precaution he has instructed them not to 
admit or discuss question of relinquishment of title or .sovereignty and 
to restrict themselves to the military operation of evacuation. You 
are right in understanding that questions of reliiKpiishment of title 
and sovereignty are committed to vou. 

^ ^ • Hay. 



Mr. Day to Mr. Hay. 

[Telegram.] 

No. 7.] Paris, Octoher 8, 1898. 

Spanish commissioners yesterday presented counter propositions, 
consisting of seven articles and covering four long type- written pages 
as to Cuba and Porto Rico. Propose to transfer sovereignty over 



24 PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. 

Cuba to the I'liited States, which is to accept it in order at pro])er 
time to turn it over to Cuban people on conditions established in the 
treaty. It is proposed to include in the transfer thus made charges 
and obligations of ever}' kind which Spain and her authorities in Cid)a 
may have lawfully contracted for the service of the island or which 
may he chargeable to the insular trea*^ury, including- all del)ts, salaries, 
civil and ecclesiastical, and pensions, civil and military, up to the rati- 
fication of the treaty. The cession of Poito Rico is to be final, but 
subject to like conditions. The articles also contain stipulations as to 
property, ariihives, and other subjects. 

We took adjournment till Tuesday in order to examine Span- 
ish proposals as well as to hear Foreman, who has come at our request 
incognito from London, 20th. At next conference intend to ask 
Spanish commissioners toexphiin their counter propositions orally, but 
unless otherwise instructed we expect to take position at once that the 
Spanish proposals as to so-called Cuban charges and obligations, as 
above described, are excluded from discussion by the unconditional 
relinquishment of sovereignty and title pledged in the protocol of the 
12th August. We also expect to stand upon language of protocol as 
to such relintiuishment. 

Day. 



Mr. Ilinj to Mr. Ihii/. 

[Ti'logrum.] 

Department of State. 

Wdshhu/ton, OvfohrrS, 1898. 
Your No. 7 received. Your answer to Spanish proposals as therein 
set forth is approved by the President. 

Hay. 



3£r. Day to Mr. Hay. 

[Telegram.] 

No. 8. J Paris, Oefoher 9. 1898. 

American commissioners examined Foreman yesterday. Went to 
Philippine Islands in 1880. left finally I8i<(i, three months after insur- 
rection ))roke out. Lived there eleven years: engaged in business and 
exploration. Been over all principal islands and most of Spanish 
posts in Mindanao. Inhabitants vary, Tagalos of Luzon and Mindoro 
the most tractable and impressionable, easy, plastic, and extremely 
hospitable: the Visayas. inhal>iting central islands — Panay, Negros, 
Cebu. Bojol. Leyte. Samar. and Mas))ate — more uncouth, less hospitable, 
and more averse to association with outsiders. Peculiar class in Panay 
of Chinese half-castes, who are traders and middlemen. Negros has 
few persons of importance: not favorite place of residence, but richest 
island for production of sugar: has no harbor. Iloilo on Panaj' being 
its entrepot. The island of Palawan almost worthless. 

The inhabitants of Sulu Archipelago and Mindanao are Mussulmans: 
have no distinctive name: have successfully resisted repeated efi'ortsof 
Spain to sul)due them: not hostile to other foreigners. Spaniards 



PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. 25 

hold in the island of Sulu, only town of Sulu. which is often raided, 
and in Mindanao only several posts on the coast. No oiw con- 
trols interior. Manila has 400. <)(>(• inhabitants, inchidino- C.ojmk) 
Chinese, (i.OOO Spaniards. 250 Eno-lish, 250 to 800 (Jernians, 8oo P>ritish 
Indians, a sprinkiino- of other foreig-nors, 50,000 Spanish half-castes, 
and rest native Tag'alos. Luzon has about 1,250,000 inhabitants. 
Whole group has aV)out 5,000,000 natives, who have been subjected b}^ 
Spaniards and are Catholics; about 1.000.000 other natives. 

There are four orders of monks — Austins or Augustinos, Dominicans, 
Kecoletos, Franciscan. The Jesuits, whose work is exclusively educa- 
tional, are moral and populai". 

The head of church is arch]>ishop, but each ordcM' has a head called 
the pi'ovincial, who is practically independent. The secular clergy, 
who are natives, claim orders not entitled to hold the incumbencies 
through which they control land. It seems orders originally took 
lX)ssession, which was afterwards confirmed by royal decrees, but 
have no title deeds. There is a system of land registration in islands, 
very recent and little used. You present proofs and eventually get 
certificate of title from chief of the treasury. Monks understood not 
to have attempted registration. They rent land, usually for three 
years, then raise rent so as to capitalize tenant's labor. This caused 
opposition and a demand for production of title deeds. Monks hold 
about 3 per cent cultivated lands in Luzon. Perhaps not more than 
six estates in group held by foreigners. Three thousand acres large 
estate. 

Friars mostly lead loose lives, get up socities called Cofradia of 
women, whom they make servants and have at beck and call. This is 
notorious and not concealed b}^ monks; examples given. Priests can 
not appear in court, but words received as truth. Civil and military 
government merely servant of orders, who dictate appointment 
and deposition governors and control them even in matters of 
life and death. Had Ceneral Blanco removed because not blood- 
thirsty. Climate Philippine Islands good. No prevalent fevers as in 
Cuba. Light fevers, but no malaria. Best and most advanced island 
is Luzon. Most insurrections there because people most advanced. 
Insurrections caused by oppressions of monks, who hare people sent 
from place to place for personal causes. Cienerally have them ))an- 
ished by governor-general to Mindanao, fludicial administration 
Philippine Islands wholly untrustworthy. Judges appointed from 
Spain. Persecution and corruption I'ife. 

Important cause of native discontent is exaction [of] compulsory 
labor fifteen days each year. Labor commutable in money. False 
returns, number of laborers, and corresponding- exactions of mone}'. 
Another cause is civil guard. Spanish officers, native men. System 
good, but abused. Men steal and extort from natives. Officers com- 
pel natives |to] furnish supplies and persecute if refused. Another 
cause is poll tax for cedula [personal civil certificate], which every 
individual over eighteen years must pay for and carry. 

Coal in Cebu merely lignite, requires mixing. Coal in Luzon l)etter 
quality, but not safe to use alone. Natives unfit for self-govenunent. 
Ideas too undeveloped. Would submit to just civilized government. 
Separation Luzon from rest group would now create scarcity labor 
outside Manila, but natives of other islands startled liy freedom of 
Luzon would want (to) come there and Luzon would be cultivated and 



26 PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. 

make pro.sperous colony. Half of island not now cultivatetl and mostly 
virgin soil. Sugar shipped to Hongkong and Shanghai. Hemp chiefly 
to America. Luzon has best soil for tobacco, cofl'ee, and all island 
products except cane sugar. 

If Spaniards retain other islands it should be on the following con- 
ditions: Expulsion and exclusion of monastic orders, permission to 
natives to go and couie freely, regulation of commerce by treaty, free 
trade between islands, and abolition of export duties. Problem of 
g'overnment not complicated by taking group, but special privileges 
necessary for the people Mindanao. Philippine Islands natives not 
troubled about religion. Native priests would not opposi^ the liiited 
States or resent coming of Protestant missionaries. (lovermnent 
pay them salaries probably averaging live hundred Mexican dollars 
yearly. Loss of this would not make trouble; mosth' have means 
(of) their own. In Philippine Islands budget 1896, church got nearly 
^7,600.000 in gold. Pensions and allowances to persons outside 
Manila, such as to descendants of Columbus. Maintenance consu- 
lates far P^ast consumed nearly HOO.OOO. Highways and pul)lic works 
nothing. Priests exact ai)Out l.OOO, (»(»<» yearly for marriages, sale 
indulgences, etc, and indirectly a tax of about 24: cents on everyone 
in parish. The (lovernment levies taxes from $5 to '^'250 on all busi- 
ness, runs lottery, licenses cock fighting, imposes stamp tax. C'orrupt 
exaction in the settlement of estate. Cock lighting should be tol- 
erated. Native life dull, amusement necessary. Spanish promises of 
reform W(mld not be fulfilled. Would be interpreted broadly. Broke 
agreement with Aguinaldo. 

If monks left, natives would claim land; orders would claim it 
collectively as corporation. Harljor in north of Luzon, called 
Apurri, 32)3 miles from Hongkong, could be made very good. Subig 
Bay. commercially objectionable l)ecause land about it is hilly 
and rises abruptly from sea, l)ut this is an advantage for national 
defense. Minuoro Island thinly populated; its development always 
opposed by Spaniards. Fine hard wood there. To take Luzon and 
leave other islands to Spain unconditionally would tend to produce 
revolutions. To take Luzon, require free ingress and egress, create 
interisland free trade, and forbid Spain to alienate other islands, would 
be almost same as taking the whole and confer favor on Europe. To 
take all wouki square itself. Expenses would be greater, but income 
also. Enough soldiers to protect group could be recruited in islands. 
Exclusive of ^Mindanao, thinks alienation of other islands by Spain 
should be prevented to keep out Germany, the great trade rival of 
Great Britain to-day and of United States in next gen<>ration. 

Sundav, t) afternoon. 

Day. 



J/r. Day to Mr. Ihiy. 

[Telegram.] 

No. i>.] Paris, (hUibcr 12. 1898. 

Joint commission met 3^esterday. We presented paper rejecting 
Spanish articles as to Cuba and Porto Rico. Spanish commissioners 
then tiled under the rules a memorandum giving reasons in support of 
their position on Cuban debt and now insist upon relinquishment and 



PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. 27 

transfer of .sovereignty to United States wliieh is to aceept it without 
any express obligation to transfer it to the Cuban people. On Cul)an 
debt we shall insist upon our original position. A niajoritv favor ad- 
herence to words of Article I of protocol as to relincjuishment of sov- 
ereignty over Cuba. Senator Cxray in favor of accepting sovereignty 
unconditionally in view of our already expressed declaration of trust 
in regard to same, and that we may thereby avoid future compli- 
cations with Cubans, claiming sovereignty while we are in process 
of pacifying island and restoring order in accordance with our own 
ideas. We desire instructions on this point. We shall, unless other- 
wise instructed, insist upon disposition of matters in first and second 
articles of the protocol before taking up Article 111. We meet again 
on Fridav. 



Wednesdav. 



Day. 



J//'. Ray to Mr. Ihiy. 

[Telegrain.] 

Depart:mext of State. 

Washington, Odoh^r 13, 189S. 
The President sees no reason for departing from instructions already 
given, but many reasons for adhering strictly to terms of protocol con- 
cerning Cuba. We must carry out the spirit and letter of the resolu 
tion of Congress. The commission will use its own best judgment as 
to pressing to definite conclusions. 

Thursdav. 3 afternoon. Hav. 



J//'. IL/y to Mr. Day. 

[Telegram.] 

Department of State. 

Washington, Octoher U. 1898. 
The Secretary of the Navy has just received the following telegram 
from Admiral Dewey, which is communicated for your mformation: 

It is important that the dii^popition of the PhiUppme Islands should be dei-ided as 
soon as possilile, and a strong government established. Spanish authority ha.« been 
completely destroyed in Luzon, and general anarchy prevails without the limits of 
the city and bay of JManila. Strongly probal)le that island.* to the south will fall 
into same state soon. Distressing reports have been received of inhuman cruelty 
practiced on religious and civil authoi-ities in other parts of tiiese islands. The 
natives ajjpear nnalile to govern. 

Dewey. 

Hay. 



2L Day to Mr. Hay. 

[Telegram.] 

No. lO.j Paris. Oetohcr i;\ 1898. 

Joint conference this afternoon. Spanish commissioners stated that 
(they) were ready to withdraw articles previously presented b}' them 
on Cuba and Porto Rico and substitute for them others more nearly 
in conformity with language of the protocol. The American conmiis- 



28 PAPERS KELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. 

sioners, availing themselves of this opportunity, immediately presented 
a paper previously prepared by them, in which they stated that, while 
accepting- all responsibilities for the protection of persons and property 
which might legallv and justly attach to the United States during the 
occupation of Cuba, they nmst again and finally decline to assume l)ur- 
den of the so-called Cuban debt either for the United States or ( Jub*. 
and offered to substitute for articles previously presented by them 
articles embodying precise language of the first and second articles 
of the protocol as to Cuba. Porto Rico, and Guam. Spanish com- 
missioners desired opportunity to consider proposal, and conference 
adjourned till Wednesday afternoon. 
Monday evening, 8.30. 

Day. 



Mr. Day to Mr. llay. 

[Telegram.] 

No. 11.1 Paris, Octohn- 17, 1S98. 

Spanish commissioners at conference to-day brought to our notice 
telegram from their Government, stating that.it had information that 
Iowa and Oregon and reinforcement of troops are going to Manila; 
also that Tagalo rebels have in their possession a large number of 
Spanish prisoners, civil as well as military. The Spanish conmiis- 
sioners made no protest, but merely asked us to communicate reports 
to our Government and represent that such things tend to create a 
state of public feeling which might embarrass the negotiations. 

We answered that, in absence of information or instructions on the 
subject which properly belonged to two Governments, we would com 
municate reports to our Govermiient. We made this promise more 
readily in view of Admiral Dewey's telegram. We feel importance 
of preserving, so far as possible, condition of things existing at the 
time of signing protocol. 

Spanish commissioners said their Government hoped Spanish pris- 
oners referred to might be liberated or turned over to American 
authorities. 

We venture to suggest that it might be advisable for our Govern- 
ment to do anything it properly can to prevent change of status quo 
in Philippine Islands, or development there of disorders which may 
seem to warrant active measures b}" Spain or other governments. 
Might not our Government, in reply to representations which it has 
received oi- probably will receive from Spanish Government, oli'er to 
take more active and positive measures than heretofore for preserva- 
tion of order and protection of life and property in Philippine Islands^ 

Mondav, 8.30, evening. 

Day. 



Mr. Day t<> Mr. llay. 

[Telegram.] 

No. 12.] Paris, Ovtoler 19. 1898. 

The conference which was to have taken place to day postponed till 
Fridav on request of Spanish commissioners. 

Day. 



PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. 29 

J//'. Ihdj to Mr. Dai/. 

[Tek'gniin.] 

DErARTMENT OE StATE, 

W(iHhi)i(/fo)i, October 19, 1898. 
TIk^ t'ollowiiiin- tcleo-ram has been received to-dav bv Seei'etary of 
War: 

M \N-ii..\, (><1nh,r 19. 
Adji'taxt-Gexekai., ]V(i.-<hui</(un: 

Situation Luzon noniewhat improved. Influence of Filipino.^ of education and 
})roperty not desiring independent government, but hostile to Spain gaining ascend- 
ency in revolutionary councils. Believe Spanish residents constantly i)lotting to 
inaugurate hostilities between out forces and insurgents. Freedom press jiermitted, 
but greatly abused. ]\Iany articles published entirely devoid of truth; have no effect 
here. Insurgent authority crude; information and application acknowledged by 
inhabitants in two-thirds Luzon, north. Aguinaldo moderately recognized. Will 
make endeaAors to gain possession of Spanish priests; now treated better than 
formerly. 

Do not anticijiate trouble with insurgents; promise nothing but enforcement of law, 
and no ent-ouragement given t\)r American assistance or protection in southern islands. 
Spanish authority precarious, confined mostly to stations of Cebu; insurgents there 
not allied to those in Luzon; appear determined to resist Spanish rule, would wel- 
come that of United States. These complications seriously affect interisland commerce 
and diminish revenue; receipts half million, Mexican, monthly. Affairs progres.sing 
favorably, though sick reptirt increasing, owing mostly to carelessness enlisted men; 
health of officers good; condition of city and facilities for quartering troops improv- 
ing. Fevers decreasing; intestinal troubles about same; many slight ailments; small- 
pox apparently arrested; during month 28 deaths — 8 smallpox, S typhoid fever, 5 
malarial and intestinal complaints, 3 accidental. 

Otis. 

Hay. 



J/r. JJaij to Mr. Hay. 

[Telegram.] 

No. 13.] Paris, Odoher 22, 1898. 

At meetino- yesterday Spanish commissioners rejected our articles, 
in which we tendered, in exact terms of protocol, relinquishment of 
sovereignty in Cuba and cession of Porto Rico and Guam. They sub- 
mitted new articles, relinquishing sovereignty over and title to Cuba, 
making United States accept said relimiuishment. and receiving- Cuba 
to lend it aid and guidance, hold, and govern until pacification realized, 
then leave control and government to Cuban people. United States to 
assume all debt not peninsular but properly and pcH-uliarly Cuban, 
character and amount to be determined by mixed commission to be 
provided for in treaty. 

Other articles not materially different, except they declare cession 
Porto Rico and other West India Islands and Guam [to be] compensa- 
tion for losses and expenses occasioned United States by the war and 
for claims of United States citizens by reason of injuries and damagi^s 
suffered in person and property during the Cuban insurrection. Un- 
less otherwise instructed we shall reject these articles and insist upon 
our articles in terms of protocol and press matters on these points to 
a conclusion. Our probable line of procedure, if you do not disap])rove 
and if we think the emerg(Micv has arisen, will be to repeat that our 
|)osition on Cuban debt is tinal and that if now again rejected nothing- 
is left to us excepting- to give notice of only one more meeting to close 
the protocol. 

Saturday, 1:2.30, afternoon. Day. 



30 PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. 

Mr. Day to J/r. /A'//. 

[Telegram.] 

No. 14. J V AUis, Ocfoher 3S, 189<S. 

In tele(>iani this morning- we stated intention to stand strictly on 
articles of the protocol. We have since read translation of the written 
memorandum, in which Spaniards make a point that we are iinwillinu- 
to assume in tr(>aty any responsibility for the protection of life and 
property durinj:;' our occupation of Cuha. or to engage to give aid and 
guidance to Cut)a as promised in our note of 8()th of July. I nder the 
circumstances we deem it important, while refusing to assume Cuban 
debt, to express readiness to incorporate in treaty properly guarded 
stipulations, acknowledging and assuming any legal responsibility to 
which we are by our own declarations and course of conduct com- 
mitted. We meet Spaniards Motulay '2 p. m. and desire instructions 

Sundav. 1.80 a. m. 

Day. 



Mr. //>/// io Mr. Ihnj. 

[Telegram.] 

Department of State. 

^(/s/u'nf/foft. Ortoher '24. 1SD8. 

Your numbers thirteen and fourteen received. Your position as to 
Cuban (U'bt and your proposed procedure in accordance with engage- 
ments of note of Julv 30th are fuUv approved. 

Hay. 



Mr. Il<nj tn Mr. Ihnj. 

Depaktment of State. 

VrmhingUm. Octohei^ U, 1S98. 
The following telegram has been received by the President from 
Habana: 

October 23, 1898. 
Believe it not possible under exi^Jting circunistant'es for Spain to complete military 
evacuation before January 1. From unofficial information have reat^on for believinfr 
that agreement with Spanish commission may be reached in fixing date. This not to 
interfere with our' taking possession at earlier date in event of completion of evacua- 
tion before that time. This statement made for your information and such direction 
as you may wish to give. 

Wade, Major-General. 

To this the President to-day made the following reply: 

Answering your message of October 23, you can fix January 1, 1899, for Spain to 
complete the military evacuation, but it should be done by that time; this date not 
to interfere with our occupation of such places as may be evacuated at an earlier 
date or which may require to occupy for military reasons. You must continue to 
insist that no fixed artillery, or military, or naval armament shall be removed or 
disposed of. 

Wu.l.IAM McKixi.EV. 

Hay. 



PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. 31 

Mr. Day t<> Mr. Hay. 

[Tek-gnim.J 

No. 15. 1 Paris, (Hohrr 2o. 1H98. 

At conference yesterday we aguin informed Spanish commissioners 
that United States would not subdivide so-called Culian del)t. Span- 
ish commissioners then intimated they were willing to meet American 
commissioners as to relincfuishment of sovereignty over Ciiba if some 
responsibility for such debt was acknowledged. We insisted upon our 
position and finally asked whether they would refuse to sign any arti- 
cles unless such acknowledgment was made. To this question the 
Spanish commissioners asked time for reply, and we adjourned till 
4 o'clock p. m. on Wednesday. Would you approve an article in 
treaty wdiich should pro\ide that the Tnited States, while not contract- 
ing any independent lia])ility of its own, would use its good othces with 
any people or government possessing so\ereignty in Cuba for acknowl- 
edgment of any debts incurred by Spain for existing internal improve- 
ments of a pacific character in the islands; a mixed commission to be 
appointed to ascertain whether any such debts exist, and if so, their 
amount. This would necessarily be a precedent for Porto Rico, (niam, 
and Philippine Islands. Commissioners may feel inclined to make this 
concession on strength of precedents and statements of publicists as to 
passing of local debts or debts incurred specially for l)enefits of trans- 
ferred territory. We hope for rt^ply before meeting again. 

Tuesdav, 5.15 afternoon. Day, 



Mr. Iliiy to Mr. Ihiy. 

[Telegram.] 

Department of State. 

Ocfoher 25, 1898. 
Answering your No. 15, the President directs me to say that under 
no circumstances will the Government of the United States assume any 
part of what is known as the Cuban debt, which is fully described in 
the memorandum of the American commissioners marked ** E " received 
this morning, nor would the United States engage to use its good offices 
to induce any government hereafter to be established in Cuba to assume 
such debt. It is not believed that there are any debts outstanding- 
incurred by Spain for existing improvements of a pacific character. 
It should l)e made clear what is meant l)y such improvements and what 
is included. The President regards it "as most desirable that in the 
present negotiations you should adhere strictly to the terms of the 
protocol. If this proves impossilde. you will ascertain as definitely 
as you can the exact meaning of their suggestions as to local Cuban 
debt and the evidences thereof and re|)oi't to the President with vour 
reconunendations. 

Hay. 



32 PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. 

l*r((Ci- ( '))llllll!xx!(Hlcfs to J//'. //{(//. 

[Telegram.] 

No. 16. j Paris, Ocfohe?' ^5, 1S9S. 

Ditferenoe.s of opinion aiiioiig I'omnii.s.sioner.s concerning Philippine 
Lslands are set forth in .statements transmitted herewith. On these 
we request early consideration and explicit instructions. Liable now 
to be confronted with this question in joint commission almost imme- 
diately. 

Day. 



(1) Information j^ained by conmiission in Paris leads to conyiction 
that it would be na\al. political, and connuercial mistake to diyide the 
archipelago. Nearly all expert testimony taken tends to this efl'ect. 
As instructions proyide for retention at least of Luzon, we do not con- 
sider question of remaining in Philippine Islands at all as now properly 
before us. We therefore ask for extension of instructions. Spain goy- 
erned and defended these islands from Manila, and with destruction of 
her fleet and the surrender of her army we became as complete masters 
of the whole group as she had been, with nothing needed to complete 
the conquest saye to proceed ^w\th the ample forces we had at hand to 
take unopposed possession. The Ladrones and Carolines were also goy- 
erned from the same capital ))y the same goyernor-general. National 
boundaries ought to follow natural diyisions, ))ut there is no natural 
[)lace for dividing Philippine Islands. 

There is hardly a single island in the group from which you can not 
shoot across to one or more of the others — scarcely another archipelago 
in the world in which the islands are crowded so closely together and 
so interdependent. Military and nayal witnesses agree that it would 
be pi'actically as easy to hold and defend the whole as a part — some 
say easier, all say safer. Agi-ee, too, that ample and trustworthy 
military force could be raised among natives, needing only United 
States otticers and a siuall nucleus of United States troops; also that 
islands could be relieved from oppressive Spanish taxation and yet 
furnish sutticient revenue for the Avhole cost (of) administration and 
defense. Great dangers must result from division. Other islands, 
seeing benefits from our government of Luzon, are sure to revolt and 
to be aided and encouraged by natives of Luzon, thus repeating in 
more aggravated form our troubles with Spain about Cuba. 

Visayas already in revolt. Division would thus insure lawlessness 
and turbulence within gunshot of our shores with no prospect of relief 
unless in Spam'sh sale of islands to unfriendly commercial rivals, which 
would prol)ably happen if we hold the most important. Luzon, and 
release the others. Generally expected now that this would be 
attempted the moment we released them. If such sale or transfer is 
to be made at all would be less dangerous to our interests if done by 
us rather than by Spain. If we do not want the islands ourselves, 
))etter to control their disposition; that is, to hold the option on them 
rather than to aljandon it. Could then at least try to protect our- 
selves by ample treaty stipulations with the acquiring powers. Com- 
mercially, division of archipelago Avould not only needlessly establish 
dangerovis rivals at our door, but would impair value of part we kept. 



PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. 33 

Present prosperity of Mcinilu depends on Its being- natural center of 
import and export trade for the whole oronp. Large part of its busi- 
ness derived from Iloilo, Cebu, and other points in south. To yield 
these to unfriendly rivals would be to provide Ijeforehand for diversion 
of business from our own possessions. Moral oljligation not to return 
Manila and Luzon to the oppressive power from which we have relieved 
them applies also to the rest of the archipelago, since Spanish power 
there is now broken and can not be restored without our consent. 

We believe public opinion in Europe, including- that of Kome, expects 
us to retain whole of the Philippine Islands, and would prefer that to 
anj'^ other solution save the impossible one of the restoration of Span- 
ish powder over all the islands. If a division should be insisted upon, 
the only one that seems to us admissi])le w^ould be by a line from the 
straits of San Bernardino south of ]VIas)xite and north of Panay to the 
northeast corner of Borneo, leaving to the United States all to the 
westward, including Luzon, Mindoro, and Palauan. This would con- 
trol the China Sea and give excellent ports of call along the whole line 
from Borneo to Hongkong; but it would throw" away the Visayas, 
including- the best sugar, hemp, and tobacco islands. These contri- 
bute a large part of Manila's trade and are inhabited generally by a 
people nearly as easy to manage as those in Luzon. We are convinced 
that much injustice has been done inhabitants in published accounts of 
their character. Even the Mohammedans of Mindanao and the Sulu 
archipelago, if left enjoyment of religious liberty and given freedom 
from oppressive taxation, would be found less intractable in opinion of 
the experts than under the rule of Spain, while the others would be 
comparatively easy to control and glad to welcome strong and just rule 
of United States. 

CusHMAx K. Davis, 
William P. Frye, 
Whitelaw Reid. 

{'2) I am unable to agree that we should peremptorily demand the 
entire Philippine island group. In the spirit of our instructions, and 
bearing- in mind the often declared disinterestedness of purpose and 
freedom from designs of conquest with which the war was undertaki^n, 
we should be consistent in our demands in making peace. Territory 
permanently held must be taken as war indemnity and with due regard 
to our responsibility because of the conduct of our military and naval 
authorities in dealing w^ith the insurgents. Whether this conduct was 
wise or unwise is not now important. We can not leave the insurgents 
to mere treaty stipulations or to their unaided resources, either to form 
a government or to battle against a foe which, (although) unequal to 
us, might readily overcome them. On all hands it is agreed that the 
inhabitants of the islands are unfit for self-government. This is par- 
ticularly true of Mindanao and the Sulu group. Only experience can 
determine the success of colonial expansion upon which the United 
States is entering. It may prove expensive in proportion to the scale 
upon which it is tried with ignorant and semibarbarous people at the 
other side of the world. It should therefore be kept within bounds. 

Accepting Luzon, strategic advantage, as shown by high naval 
authority, may require cession of that part of the group lying north 
and west of a line drawn through St. Bernardino Strait south of Luzon 
to St. Bernardino Islet, and thence by the Naranjos Islands and certain 

S. Doc. 148 3 



34 PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. 

courses and distances to Tambisaii Islands on the nortlieast coast of 
Borneo, conveying to the United States Luzon, Mindoro. Palawan, and 
various other islands, thus controlling the entrance to China Sea with 
additional harbors and ports of call. The objection that other islands 
will be acquired b}' European powers without regard to our interests 
can be obviated by treaty stipulation for nonalienation without the 
consent of the United States. There should be also stipulations for 
absolute freedom of the trade and intercourse among all the islands of 
the group. This gives us practically control of the situation with a 
base for the navy and commerce in the east (and^ responsibility for 
the people to whom we owe obligation and those must likely to become 
fit for self-government. It affords an opportunity for lessening the 
burden of colonial government, with room for further expansion if 
desired. It does not leave us open to the imputation of following 
agreement to negotiate with demand for whole subject-matter of dis- 
cussion ourselves. 

William K. Day. 

(3) The undersigned can not agree that it is wise to take Philippine 
Islands in whole or in part. To do so would be to reverse accepted 
continental policy of the country, declared and acted upon throughout 
our history. Propinquity governs the case of Cuba and Porto Rico. 
Policy proposed introduces us into European politics and the entan- 
gling alliances against which Washington and all American statesmen 
have protested. It will make necessary a navy equal to largest of 
powers; a greatly increased military establishment; immense sums for 
fortifications and harbors; multiply occasions for dangerous complica- 
tions with foreign nations, and increase burdens of taxation. Will 
receive in compensation no outlet for American labor in labor market 
already overcrowded and cheap; no area for homes for American citi- 
zens; climate and social conditions demoralizing to character of Amer- 
ican youth; new and disturbing questions introduced into our politics; 
church question menacing. On whole, instead of indemnity — injury. 

The undersigned can not agree that any obligation incurred to insur- 
gents is paramount to our own manifest interests. Attacked Manila 
as part of legitimate war against Spain. If we had captured C'adiz 
ancl Carlists had helped us, would not owe duty to stay by them at the 
conclusion of war. On the contrary, interests and duty would require 
us to abandon both Manila and Cadiz. No place for colonial adminis- 
tration or government of subject people in American system. So iiuich 
from standpoint of interest; but even conceding all benefits claimed 
for annexation, we thereby abandon the infinitely greater benefit to 
accrue from acting the part of a great, powerful, and Christian nation; 
we exchange the moral grandeur and strength to be gained by keeping 
our word to nations of the world and by exhibiting a magnanimity and 
moderation in the hour of victory that becomes the advanced civiliza- 
tion we claim, for doubtful material advantages and shameful stepping 
down from high moral position boastfully assumed. We should set 
example in these respects, not follow in the selfish and vulgai- greed 
for territory which Europe has inherited from medieval times. Our 
declaration of war upon Spain was accompanied by a solemn and delib- 
erate definition of our purpose. Now that we have achieved all and 
more than our object, let us simply keep our word. Third article of 
the protocol leaves everything concerning the control of the Philippine 
Islands to negotiation between the parties. 



PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. 35 

It is absurd now to say that we will not nt'uotiato })ut will appro- 
priate the whole subject-niatter of neo-otiation. ' At the very least let 
us adhere to the President's instructions and if conditions require the 
keeping- of Luzon forego the material advantages claimed in annexing 
other islands. Above all let us not make a mockery of the injunction 
contained in those instructions, where, after stating that we took up 
arms only in obedience to the dictates of humanity and in the fulfill- 
ment of high public and moral obligations, and that we had no design 
of aggrandizement and no ambition of conquest, the President among 
other things eloquently savs: 

It is my earnest wish that the United States in making peace should follow the 
same high rule of conduct which guided it in facing war. It should be as s(;rupulou8 
and magnanimous in the concluding settlement as it was just and humane in its 
original action. 

This and more, of which I earnestly ask a reperusal, binds my con- 
science and governs my action. 

Geoege Gray. 

Wednesday, 12.30, night. 



Mr. Hay to Mr. Day. 

[Telegram.] 

Department of State, 

Wa><Ungton, October 26, 1898. 
The information which has come to the President since your depar- 
ture convinces him that the acceptance of the cession of Luzon alone, 
leaving the rest of the islands subject to Spanish rule, or to be the sub- 
ject of future contention, can not be justified on political, commercial, 
or humanitarian grounds. The cession must be of the whole archi- 
pelago or none. The latter is wholly inadmissible and the former must 
therefore be required. The President reaches this conclusion after 
most thorough consideration of the whole subject, and is deepl}' sensi- 
ble of the grave responsibilities it will impose, believing that this 
course will entail less trouble than an}^ other and besides will best sub- 
serve the interests of the people involved, for whose welfare we can 
not escape responsibilitv. 

Hay. 



Mr. Day to Mr. Hay. 

[Telegram.] 

No. 17.] Paris. Octoler 27, 1898. 

Pursuant to offer approved by you and afterwards made by us to 
Spanish commissioners, we contemplate insertion in treaty, unless 
otherwise instructed, of the following clause: 

The United States assumes and will discharge the obligations resting upon it 
under international law for the protection of life and property in the island of Cuba 
during its occupation thereof. 

Day. 



i^6 PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. 

Mr. Day to Mr. Adee. 

[Telegram.] 

Paris, Octohn^ 27, 1898. 
Special (No. 17 A) for the President. j. 

Our teleg-ram No. 15 to Secretary of State Hay informs you of the 
question put by us to Spanish oonmiissionei's on Monday. Last night 
Spanish ambassador called upon Mr. Reid. Represented that Spanish 
commissioners nnist break oti' treaty rather than answer it in such wise 
as to abandon their claims on Cuban debt unless they could get some 
concession elsewhere. Mr. Reid assured ambassador that we could 
not assume this debt. The American people and commission abso- 
lutely united upon it without exception and without distinction of 
party. Ambassador then urged the ([uestion to be hiid aside until it 
could be seen if some concessions elsewhere might not be found which 
would sav«^ Spanish conunission from utter repudiation at home; if 
not, rupture was inevitable. ^Nlontinx) Rios eould not return to Madrid 
now if known to have accepted entire Cuban indebtedness.^ 

Mr. Reid said conunissioners insisting on settlement of Cu})an l)iisi- 
ness now. Ambassador again said that if forced to direct answer on 
the question now must answer no and break oti* conference. Mr. Reid 
earnestlv urged them not to take that course, declaring that it must 
be far worse for Spain. Ambassador then begged him to search for 
some possible concession somewhere, and inquired about Philippine 
Islands. Mr. Rerd said at tirst the American people not very eager 
for them; believed, however, had practically concjuered them when 
conquered capital, sunk fleet, and captured arms, and had right to all 
of them. Preponderance of sentiment in favor of the taking all, but 
respectable and influential minority which did not go to that lenoth. 
It was possible, he said, but not prol)able, that out of these conditions 
the Spanish commissioners might be able to And something either in 
territory or debt which might seem to their people at home like a 
concession. 

To-day Spanish commissioners presented document now bemg trans- 
lated, which we understand accepts articles proposed by us, subject to 
agreement in final treaty, and invite proposals as to the Philippine 
Islands from us. After meeting Spanish secretary said to me that 
they accepted our articles in the hope of liberal treatment in Philip- 
pine Islands; said no government in Spain could sign treaty giving 
up everything and live, and that such surrender without some relief 
would mean national bankruptcy. He made further appeal, to which 
I made no answer except to receive his communication. We shall 
now be in position to take up Philippine Islands matter. We deem it 
proper that vou should know exact situation before sending conven- 
tional instructions on Philippine Islands. We are inclined now to 
believe that rupture to-day only averted because Spaniards grasped at 
hint thrown out in the conversation of Mr. Reid last night with 
ambassador. 

Thursday morning, 3. 

Day. 



PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. 37 

Mr. Day to Mr. Hay. 

[Telegram.] 

No. 18.] Paris, Octoher 27, 1898. 

At meeting to-day Spaniards accepted our last draft articles 1 and 
2 as to Cuba, Puerto Rico, and Guam in exact language of protocol, 
expressly subject to agreement being reached on all the articles which 
treaty should contain. Then asked when we should be ready to pro- 
ceed to question of Philippine Islands, and on our motion adjournment 
had till Monday for that purpose, Tuesday and Wednesday following 
being religious holidays. Understood if not ready ^Slonda}^ can have 
what further time desired. 



Thursday, 4.30 afternoon. 



Day. 



Mr. Hay to Mr. Day. 

[Telegram.] 

Washington, OctoJjer 27, 1898. 
President in Philadelphia. Have sent him to-da3^'s dispatches. He 
returns here to-morrow morning. Instructions will be sent to-morrow. 
Thursday, 1.30 afternoon. 

Hay. 



Mr. Hay to Mr. Day. 

[Telegram.] 

Department of State, 

Wanhlngtoiu Octoher 28, 1898. 

While the Philippines can be justly claimed by conquest, which 
position must not be yielded, 3'et their disposition, control, and gov- 
ernment the President prefers should be the subject of negotiation as 
provided in the protocol. It is imperative upon us that as victors we 
should be governed only b}" motives which will exalt our nation. 
Territorial expansion should be our least concern; that we shall not 
shirk the moral obligations of our victory is of the greatest. It is 
undisputed that Spain's authorit}' is permanently destrove d in every 
part of the Philippines. To leave any part in her feeble control now 
would increase our difficulties and be opposed to tlhe interests of 
humanity. The sentiment in the United States is amost universal 
that the people of the Philippines, whatever else is done, must be 
liberated from Spanish domination. In this sentiment the President 
fully concurs. Nor can we permit Spain to transfer any of the 
islands to another power. Nor can we invite another power or powers 
to join the United States in sovereignty over them. We must either 
hold them or turn them back to Spain. 

Consequently, grave as are the responsibilities and unforeseen as are 
the difficulties which are before us. the President can see but one plain 
path of duty — the acceptance of the archipelago. Greater difficulties 
and more serious complications — administrative and international- 
would follow any other course. The President has given to the views 



38 PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. 

of the commissioners the fullest consideration, and in reaching- the 
conclusion a))ove announced in the light of information connnunicated 
to the commission and to the President since your departure, he has 
been influenced by the single consideration of duty and humanity. 
The President is not unmindful of the distressed financial condition of 
Spain, and whatever consideration the United States may show must 
come from its sense of generosity and benevolence, rather than from 
any real or technical obligation. The terms upon which the full 
cession of the Philippines shall be made must be left largely with the 
commission. But as its negotiations shall proceed it will develop the 
Spanish position, and if any new phase of the situation arise, the 
commission can further conmumicate with the President. How these 
instructions shall be carried out. and whether to be presented as a 
preemptorv demand, the President leaves to the judgment and discre- 
tion of the commissioners. 
Friday, 3.80 afternoon. 

Hay. 



J//-. Ihnj io Mr. Day. 

[Telegram— personal.] 

Department of State, 

WihsJungton, Octohei- 28, 1898. 
The instruction sent to-day a))out Philippines has the cordial con- 
currence of the seven members of Cabinet now in Washington, Long 
being absent in Massachusetts. Gage has written you in the same 
sense. Let me add your course has the warm approval of us all. 

Hay. 



J/r. Day to Mr. II, uj. 

No. 19.J Paris, Octoler 9.9, 1898. 

Telegraphic instructions as to Philippine Islands received. We will, 
unless otherwise instructed, present on Monday an article to provide 
for cession of the whole group, together with statement that we are 
prepared to insert in the treat}' a stipulation foi' the assum})tion l)v the 
United States of any existing indebtedness of Spain incurred for nec- 
essaiy works and improvements of a pacific character in the Philippine 
Islands. 

Day. 



Mr. Hay to Mr. Day. 

[Telegram.] 

Washington, Octoler 30, 1898. 
Your No. 19 received. Your proposition to assume any existing 
indebtedness of Spain incurred for public works and improvements of 
a pacific character in the Philippines is approved. 

Hay. 



PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. 39 

Ml'. Frye to Mr. Adee. 



[Telegram.] 

Paris, October 30, 1898. 



( For the President. ] 



It seems to me that the most undesiraljle happening- would he our 
return without a treaty of peace, and yet that is probable in my opinion. 
If the Spanish commissioners should accede to our demands as at pres- 
ent outlined they could not return home, while our countr}^ it may 
be, would not justify us in tendering an}^ more liberal terms, Spain 
made a determined light to secure concessions as to the C-uban debt, 
while we were persistent in our refusal to yield anything. Our articles 
were accepted, but provisionally, for if no tinal agreement is reached 
the}^ too, failed. It seemed to me that we might have agreed to use 
our good offices with any government hereafter established in Cuba to 
secure the assumption by it of any indebtedness incurred in internal 
improvements there, and ourselves assume any like indebtedness in 
the territories finally ceded to us. The amount could not be large. 
Might we not go further and agree to pay to Spain from ten to twenty 
million dollars if thus a treat}" could be secured^ If no treaty, then 
war, a continued disturbance of ])usiness. an expenditure of a million 
dollars a day, and further loss of life. Would not our people prefer 
to pay Spain one-half of war expenditures rather than indulge in its 
costly luxury? Europe s^'iiipathizes with Spain in this regard exactly. 

The correspondent of the London Times, in his yesterday's letter, 
criticised severel}^ our attitude. The precedents for the last century- 
are antagonistic to our position. Of course we will not pay debts 
incurred in the suppression of colonial rebellions. I do not forget 
that we demand no money indemnity for cost of war to us. It may 
be because our enemy is bankrupt. I am sorry the Carolines were 
not taken by us, as they are infinitely more valuable than the Ladrones. 
If war is resumed I hope orders will be given Dewey to seize at once 
all of the Philippine Islands, also the Carolines. 

You may be sure I should not make these suggestions if I did not 
regard a treaty of peace of vital importance to our country and the 
danger of failure to secure it gravely imminent. 

Sunday, midnight. 

Frye. 



Mr. Hay to Mr. Frye. 

[Telegram.] 

Departaient of State, 

Waf<hin(/to?i, Noveviber i, 1898. 
Your message marked special received yesterda}'. The President 
directs me to say that no one would more deeply regret than himself 
a failure to make a treaty of peace, and is surprised to hear from you 
that that result is not improbable. He hopes and believes that your 
negotiations can be so conducted as to prevent so undesirable a hap- 
pening. He desires the commissioners to be generous in all matters 
which do not require a disregard of principle or dut3% and whatever 



40 PAPERS EELATI>;G to the treaty with SPAIN. 

the oommis.sioners may deem wise and best in the matter of the 
debts for internal improvements and public works of a paeitic char- 
acter in the Philippines will receive his favorable consideration. Nor 
does he desire the commission to disregard well-established precedents 
or make any conditions which will not be worthy of ourselves and 
merit the approval of the best judoment of mankind. If it should be 
the opinion of the commissioners that there should be paid a reason- 
able sum of mone}' to cover peace improvements, which are fairly 
chargeable to us under established precedents, he will give cheerful 
concurrence. The money payment, if any is determined upon, should 
rest solely upon the considerations suggested in your message of 
Sunday night. He desires that you may read this to the commission 
with vour message to him. 

Hay. 



Mr. Day to M,\ Adee. 

[Telegram.] 

United States Peace Coiminiission, 

Far/.s. Xonmher 3, 189S—10 a. i„. 

(For the Pres^itlent. — Special.) 

After a careful examination of the authorities, the majority of the 
commission are clearly of opinion that our demand for the Phili])pine 
Islands can not be based on conquest. When the protocol was signed 
Manila was not captured, siege was in progress and capture made after 
the execution of the protocol. Captures made after agreement for 
armistice must be disregarded and status quo restored as far as practi- 
cable. We can require cession of Philippine Islands onlv as indemnity 
for losses and expenses of the war. Have in view, also, condition of 
islands, the ])roken power of Spain, anarchy in which our withdrawal 
would leave the islands, etc. These are legitimate factors. Have 
written fully. 

Thursdav, 11. 3U morning. Day. 



Mr. Hay to Mr. JJay. 
[Telegram.] 

Department of State. 

Wa.s/ii'>i(/ton. Xovemher 3^ 1898. 
The President has received your dispatch of this date and awaits 
your letter. ^leantime, however, the question may be ultimately 
determined. He assumes you have not yielded the claim by right of 
conquest. In fact, the destruction of the Spanish fleet on ]\Iay 1 was 
the conquest of ]\Ianila. the capital of the Philippines. The President 
has confidence that the commission will be able to make a treaty on 
just and honorable grounds: a failure to do so would be greatly 
to be regretted. 

Hay. 



PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. 41 

J//'. Day to 2fr. Ade^. 

[Telegram.] 

Paris, November J^, 1898— 2. W. 
(For the President— Special.) 

Telegram of November 3 from the Secretary of State received. "We 
have not yielded the claim by a right of conquest. Telegram to you 
on that subject was on the afternoon of discussion with Spanish com- 
missioners. We shall not foreclose important matters without advis- 
ing you. We are doing all in our power to secure treaty in accord- 
ance with your views. In the opinion of a majority of the commis- 
sion we shall not promote this end by putting forward the claim that 
Manila was taken by conquest on May 1. Subsequent military oper- 
ations and capitulation, no les.-< than miitual acceptance of protocol, 
preclude making demand upon that ground. Our opinion as to in- 
effectiveness of capitulation after protocol has alreadv been stated. 

Day. 



I think we can demand cession of entire archipelago on other and 
more valid grounds than a perfected territorial conc[uest of the Phil- 
ippine Islands, such as indemnity or as conditions of peace imposed 
by our general military success and in view of our future security and 
general welfare, commercial and otherwise. I think the protocol 
admits all these grounds, and that the ground alone of perfected terri- 
torial conquest of the Philippine Islands is too narrow and untenable 
under protocol. 

Friday. 3.30 afternoon. 

CusHJViAN K. Davis. 



J//'. Hay to Mr. Day. 

[Telegram.] 

Department of State, 

Washingto)}. JS^cu'einber 5, 1898. 
Yours of November 4. special, and that of Senator Davis received. 
The President has no purpose to question the commission'.s judgment 
as to the grounds upon which the cession of the archipelago is to be 
claimed. His only wish in that respect is to hold all the ground upon 
which we can fairly and justly make the claim. He recognizes fully 
the soundness of putting forward indemnity as the chief ground, but 
conquest is a consideration which ought not to be ignored. How our 
demand shall be presented, and the grounds upon which vou will rest 
it. he contiidently leaves with the commissioners. His great concern 
is that a treaty shall be effected in terms which wiU not only satisfy 
the present generation but. what is more important, be justilied in 
the judgment of posterity. The argument which shall result in such 
a consummation he confides to the commission. He appreciates the 
difficulties and embarrassments, and realizes the delicate work Tiefore 
you. but that the commissioners will be able to conclude a treaty of 
peace satisfactorily to the country, justified by humanity and by prece 
dent, is the belief of the President and vour countrvmen generallv. 

Hay. 



42 PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. 

J//'. J>a>i to Jlr. Jhnj. 

[Telegram.] 

No. 20.] Paris, Nm^emhrd, 1898. 

Spanish oommissioner.s, in paper presented yesterday, maintain 
that demand for whole Philippine Islands violates protocol, which by 
its terms contemplated only provisional occupation Manila and did not 
impair Spanish sovereig-nty over grou]). They cite circular French 
minister for foreign atl'airs of Augnist last announcing to French 
ambassadors in Europe the signature of protocol ana saying our 
demand Philippine Islands was for provisional occupation of ]Manila 
by the American forces; also clause of capitulation 5lanila providing 
for return of arms to Spanish forces on evacuation of city. They also 
invoke our argument that Spain is now precludt^d from bringing for- 
ward Cu])an del)t ])ecause she faiUnl to mention it during negotiation 
of protocol. They ([uote interviews between the President and Cam- 
bon to show th;it former did not intend to demand cession group, but 
agreed that Philippine Islands question should be subject of negotia- 
tion at Paris and particularly his declaration that clause in protocol 
did not decide anything against either (lovernment; also refer to 
answer in Spanish note of August 7 to demand as to Phili])pine Ishuids 
as showing their (iovcM'nment's understtuiding thereof, and argue that 
United States ])y omitting to deny admitted correctness of that under- 
standing. They further maintain that nothing has occurred since sign- 
ing of protocol to justify Tnited States in iMdarging demands. 

As to our proposal to assume debts for ])acitic impi'ovements, they 
say archipehigo burdened with debt 4U(>,UOU.()(iO pesetas, or ^»t.(lOO.OO(», 
secured by moi'tgages on revenues Manila custom-house, vesting in 
third parties of \arious nationalities rights which do not belong to 
Spain. They declare and say that they hope there will be no necessity 
to repeat that Spain can not and ought not. since respect for others 
forbids it, to agree in any treaty to anything implying impairment or 
suppression or even disregard of private rights of others against the 
will of their legitimate and special proprietors. They say there are 
besides unsecured cok)nial debts. These likewise forl)id acceptance of 
American proposal which involves revision of legitimate acts of internal 
sovereignty, the debt having been lawfully contracted. Any inquiry 
whether proceeds were judiciously invested is inadmissible on grounds 
of national self-respect or as affecting obligation of del)t. 

Spanish paper then discusses armistice; maintains ineffectiveness 
capitulation of Manila, and holds acts of military administration unlaw- 
ful, such as taking public funds, collecting reveiuies. and controlling 
courts and police; and specilically complains of alleged release on Sep- 
tember 21 of 13 prisoners in jail forconmion crimes, which it describes 
as an unheard of act. On points of law they cite article 140 of 
our instructions to armies in held, Halleck's International Law, and 
Field's Code, and sa}' that, according to authorities and the protocol, 
treaty of peace should provide for immediate delivery of Manila to 
Spain, immediate release of garrison, return to Spanish (iovernment 
of alt funds and public propert}^ taken by American army since its 
occupation of place, and all taxes collected, and indenmitication of 
Spain for damages occasioned by detentions Spanish troops resulting 
in spread of Tagalo insurrection and involving ill-treatment of Spanish 
prisoners. 



PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. 43 

In conclusion, Spanish commissioners invite American commission- 
ers to present a proposition in accordance with articles 3 and (3 of 
the protocol, and covering- obligations of United States growing out of 
acts of war committed after signing of protocol, in seizing Manila and 
doing of things in excess of rights under article 3. We have word of 
Freiich minister for foreign affairs that statement in his circular was 
oversight and will immediately be corrected. We are preparing reply 
to Spanish paper to be presented at next joint meeting on Tuesday 
afternoon. 

Saturdav, 6 afternoon. Day. 



Jlr. Day to Jlr. Ilay. 

[Telegram.] 

No. 21. J Paris, Noveniber 9, 1898. 

In order to finish copying answer to Spanish paper on the Philippine 
Islands, we asked postponement of meeting yesterday from 2 to 4 o'clock 
p. m. Spanish commissioners replied that they had engagement later 
in the afternoon, and suggested postponement till 2 to-day. We met 
accordingly this afternoon and presented answer. We repel Spanish 
assumption that we base our demands as to Philippine Islands on 
concessions in the protocol, as in the case of Cuba and Porto Rico, 
but we maintain that by third article we reserved and secured full 
and absolute right to make demands in future, and that our present 
demands are justified by and are included in the terms of the protocol. 
We also deny that provisions of the protocol can be qualified or limited 
by anything in Spanish notes prior to its signature. We show by 
review of the negotiations and of interviews at Executive Mansion that 
protocol was made only because Spanish response of August 7 was 
unacceptable. 

We quote to same effect from French Yellow Book telegram of Mr. 
Cambon transmitting draft of protocol and saying United States had 
decided to state precisely (preciser) therein the terms on which negoti- 
ations for peace would be undertaken. We quote in full note of Secre- 
tary of State to Cambon, of August 10. and show that our interpretation 
is justified by written correspondence, conversations at Executive 
Mansion, and" terms of protocol. We go over this ground at length. 
We express surprise at apparent renewal of Cuban debt question so 
soon after it was waived. We quote their language as to not wishing 
to have to refer to this again, and as to not permitting any discussion of 
certain phases of the question, characterizing this as language unusual 
in diplomacy unless to convey a deliberate ultimatum. We then 
inquire again as to final intentions of Spanish commissioners upon 
this subject. We call attention to admitted fact that considerable part 
of proceeds Cuban loans was expended in prosecuting war against 
United States, and inquire if they mean to be understood as refusing to 
permit any consideration of this expenditure. 

We then take up question of capitulation of Manila, and maintain 
that our powers as occupant under the protocol are the same iii all 
respects as to government and administration as under capitulation. 
In closing, we refer to another aspect of capture of Manila; noting 
that Spanish commissioners complain of it as occurring a few hours 



44 PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. 

after signature of protocol, we ask if just and impartial mind might 
not consider why not captured before — namely, through humane 
desire to save city and Spanish residents from dreaded vengeance of 
insurgents, and suggest that men to whom that humane delay was due, 
General Merritt and Admiral Dewey, were entitled to better treat- 
ment than their insinuation of needless slaughter and conscious 
violation of protocol. 

Our answer covered 50 tj'pewritten pages. Spanish commission- 
ers asked till Saturday to study it, and reserved right to ask, if neces- 
sary, for more time. At this, the next meeting, we may need to 
outline definite and linal propositions on whole question of Philippine 
Islands, including possible cash payments. 

Wednesdav evening, 9.30. 

Day. 



Mr. Bay to Mr. Hay. 

fTelegram.! 

No. 22.] ' Paris, November 10, 1898. 

We have information Philippines debt as follows: Prior to insur- 
rection, August, 1(S!»6, colony paid its way by local taxes and moderate 
tariff. After war began captain-general instructed to draw from 
prosperous local banks, such as deposit bank, local savings bank, and 
Banco Hispano-Filipino. He also obtained advances from friars. 
Expenses increasing, colonial minister empowered to draw on funds 
raised for expenses Cuban war, which he did to the extent of 
7,660,403yVV pesos, or dollars. Expenses still increasing Govern- 
ment was authorized by law of Cortes, tenth June, 1897, published 
Madrid Gazette 29th June, to grant general guarantee of nation for 
operations of credit which would be necessary for Philip])ine Islands 
in consequence of disturbances there. Then royal decree 28th June, 
1897, authorized colonial minister to issue four hundred thousand 
hypothecated ])onds of Philippine Islands treasury, at six per cent, 
redeemable at par in forty years, Avith special guarantee of Philippine 
Islands revenues and general guarantee of Spanish nation. 

The issue consists of one series of two hundred tifty thousand 
bonds of five hundred pesetas each, and another of one hundred and 
fifty thousand bonds of one hundred pesos each; first series reserved 
for issue in Spain, two hundred thousand immediately placed, and fifty 
thousand kept back by minister for the colonies and placed later on, also 
in Spain; second series intended for ^Manila, part to reiml)urse advances 
and rest to be placed there. This loan produced 38,570,494:3Vcr 
pesos net. Madrid Gazette, 20th October, 1898, shows that of this sum 
19, 891,800x^0 were used for war in Philippine Islands; 7,660,-103yVo 
reimbursed to Cuban treasury, and 10,938.477x1 o advanced to same, 
leaving balance 13th June, 1898, to credit of Philippine Islands treas- 
urv of 79,813xW pesos. Nothing in Gazette or other official document 
shows an}^ part of this loan applied to purelv local purposes or objects 
of utilitv. It is said that not 5 per cent of Philippine Islands ])onds 
have been placed outside of Spain and colonies, and of fifteen million 
intended for Manila between ten and eleven million actually }:>laced 
there and rest returned to Spain and placed easily, chieffy in Barcelona. 

You may expect very shortly a telegram embodying views of 
American commissioners on Philippine Islands question. 

Day. 



PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. 45 

Peace commissioner's to Mr. Hay. 

[Telegram.] 

No. 23 -Special.] Paris, November 11, 1898. 

Our commissioners desire definite instructions as to Pliilippine 
Islands as soon as practicable. The following- statements embody indi- 
vidual expression of their views upon the subject. 

Moore. 

(1) Holding- the view that the Philippine Islands group is likely to prove 
a burden rather than a benefit to the United States, I would minimize 
our holdings there to the lowest point consistent with our o))ligations. 
This view I undertook to express in m}' telegram of October 25, 
Our advantage is a naval and commercial base in the East. More 
than this we should not seek. Our obligations seem to require us to 
take Luzon and islands so near as to be essential thereto. Assuming 
that the President and Cabinet have determined to take whole group, 
then I believe we will be justified in paying lump sum, sav fifteen mil- 
lions, recognizing- that we are dealing with a bankrupt people; that 
Spain loses her colonies, the revenues of which are charged with out- 
standing debts, and parts with a considerable portion of her revenue- 
producing domain. I would assume no part of the so-called Cuban 
and Philippine Islands bonded debt. 

Rather than fail to secure treaty of peace I think demand for whole 
group might be so modified as to let Spain keep Mindanao and Sulu 
group without conditions, paying same sum as above indicated. These 
islands with money payment would be a substantial concession. In 
that alternative we might secure one of the Caroline group as naval 
station and at the same time safe-guard our interests and people there. 

Day. 

(2) Favor taking the entire group and paj'ing ten million dollars 
in gold, a fair estimate of debt properly chargeable to the Philippine 
Islands. If necessary to secure treaty, and I believe it is, I would take 
Luzon, Mindoro, Palawan, also Ponape of the Carolines, paying from 
five to ten millions of dollars. I would require: First, free interchange 
of products of the islands for consumption there, also that products of 
other islands in group intended for export from Manila be admitted 
free with distribution of goods imported into ^Manila to other islands 
without additional duties. Second, the right of entry into such ports 
of the Philippine Islands as are not ceded, upon terms of equal favor 
with Spanish ships and merchandise in relation to port and customs 
charges, while Spain shall have similar rights as to her subjects and 
vessels in the ports of any territories in their Pacific Islands ceded to 
the United States. Third, charges against American vessels for entry 
into peninsular ports of Spain no higher than imposed on Spanish vessels 
in American ports. Fourth, in all ports of these islands remaining- 
under Spanish rule our citizens shall have all questions at issue tried 
before an American consul or other duly qualified American officer. 
Fifth, all persons held by Spain for political acts performed in Cuba, 
Puerto Rico, Ponape, Guam, or the Philippine Islands to be immedi- 
atel}^ released. Sixth, absolute freedom of religion in the Philippine 
Islands, Ladrones, and Caroline Islands. Seventh, United States shall 
have the rioht to land cables on anv of these islands and the tolls for 



46 PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. 

messages on our tnuis-Paeitic euldes or iiiterisland lines shall l)e regu- 
lated by the Government of the Tnited States. Eighth. United States 
shall have the right to extend its submarine cables from Puerto Kieo, 
via the Canaries, to the coast of Africa or Spain and thence to any 
Spanish Mediterranean island. Apply so many of these articles as may 
be necessarv if the entire Philippine Islands group is taken. 

Fkye. 

(3) The undersigned begs to say that, while adhering to the views 
expressed in his telegram of the '2ikh October, he is of the opinion that 
it is immensely important to the country that we should not separate 
without the conclusion of a treaty of peace. A renewal of the state of 
active war, even if Spain's resistance })e continued feeble or none at 
all, would compel us to seize with the strong hand all of hei- colonial 
possessions. This is not a role that is desirable for the United States 
to assume. We have achieved all and more than we went to war to 
accomplish, and Spain has conceded it in a protocol. The same i)ro- 
tocol left the fate of the Philii)pine Islands to be determined 1)V a 
treaty to be thereafter concluded between the two countries. ^ The 
stipulation was not that it should be determined as the United States 
should dictate, but by a treaty between the parties. This necessarily 
leaves it open to a negotiation which must result in an agreement 
which implies a quasi freedom of consent by Spain as w^ell as by the 
United States. If that consent can not b(> obtained we are relegated 
to the state of active war which the armistice suspended, and the 
sword will again be drawn and the concpiest completed. Though 
Spain makes no physical resistance, she will state her case to the 
world as having consented to do all that she promised to do in the 
protocol, but that she could not su))scribe to terms which she had no 
right to expect. 

It would, in the opinion of the undersigned, be most unfortunate 
if the United States should feel compelled to abandon the high position 
taken at the l)eginning of the war and. instead of crowning their tri- 
umphs by setting an example of moderation, restraint, and reason in 
victory, act the part of a ruthless concpieror. Believing that the result 
of a failure to ol)tain a treaty would be the forcible seizure of the 
whole Philippine Islands group, an event greatly to be dt»precated as 
inconsistent with the traditions and civilization of the United States. I 
would be willing to take the islands by the cession of a treaty of peace, 
and 1 would, to that end, make such reasonable concessions as would 
comport with the magnanimity of a great nation dealing with a weak 
and prostrate foe. 1 mean that I would prefer the latter alternative 
to the former, not that I have changed my mind as to the policy of 
taking the Philippine Islands at all. 

George Gray, 

(4) Our duty not to return to Spain any territory in which we have 
broken down her rule has been enforced in our instructions from the 
outset. Furthermore, the right of a nation which has been successful 
in a war forced upon it to exact an indemnitv afterwards for the cost 
of the war is recognized. Adding pensions and other proper items to 
this cost as already tabulated, we have a total of between two hundred 
and fifty and three hundred millions. Spain is without money or the 
means of procuring it, and can therefore pay us in nothing' but terri- 



PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. 47 

tory. She has so far given us onh' FuerloJlioo. How far does that 
go towards repaj'ing our outlay iu cash, to say nothing of the derange- 
ment of business and loss of life^ For a standard of valuation we 
may perhaps refer to the live considerable purchases of territor}^ we 
have made within a century and the others we have considered. 

We paid twelve millions for Louisiana; live million for Florida; fifteen 
million for territor}- acquired from ]Mexico under the treaty of Guada- 
loupe, including New Mexico, Colorado (and) California; ten million for 
territory acquired in like manner by the (jadsden purchase; and seven 
million two hundred thousand for Alaska. We once offered seven mil- 
lion and a half for St. Thomas and St. Johns, and later could have had 
that whole group for five million. For Cuba we once talked of paying 
one hundred million, and at another time a hundred and twenty-five mil- 
lion. Taking this last as coming nearest to fixing a standard of value 
in the present case, we may reckon that Puerto Rico, farther from us, 
less important to the protection of our coasts, and only one-twelfth 
size, though with nearly one-half as much population, could not b}" 
any possil)ility be regarded as indemnity for more than fort}" or lift}' 
million of our just claim. Even if Cuba were added in its present 
devastated and depopulated condition, the present valuation of the two 
would not repay the outlay forced upon us by the war; but we have 
all along refused to take Cuba. What else has Spain with which to 
repay us except the archipelago, which lies at our mercy with its cap- 
ital in our possession? Its area is just about two and a half times that 
of Cuba, but instead of being near our coasts it is halfway around the 
globe from us. Some of our people think it worthless to us, and prob- 
ably few that it could be valued so high as the remaining two hundred 
or two hundred and fifty million of our cash outlay; but it is an asset 
of some sort — whether to develop or to dispose of — and we ought now 
to retain the power to do either as the Government and the people on 
fuller knowledge may determine. 

Are at the end of six weeks of fruitless negotiation (one-half longer 
than it took France and Germany to agree upon their first treat}' of 
peace after their last war) this suggests to me now the desirableness of 
our calling time on the Spanish commissioners, and giving notice that 
we must either make some progress or close the protocol. At the same 
time, in our own interest, we must shrink from renewing the war, even 
in name, over our prostrate foe, and must take into consideration the 
great desirableness of securing a definite and permanent treaty of peace 
To do this I would be willing to make some concessions from our just 
dues if sure they could not be misinterpreted and used as a pretext 
for greater delays and further unreasonable demands. 

1 would be willing, as one proposition, under such conditions and 
only as a certain means of speedily securing a treaty, to leave Spain 
Mindanao and the Sulu group in the southern part of the Philippine 
Islands — that is to say, the Mohanunedan pai-t of the archipelago, 
being about one-third of it — and take instead all the Carolines and the 
Ladrones, while making stringent requirements as to the freedom of 
religion as well as forbidding Spanish restrictions on trade with the 
rest of the Philippine Islands. I would not compromise our position 
on the Cuban debt by doing anything to recognize that of the Philip- 
pine Islands, it being apparent that it was used to prosecute the war 
against insurgents, partly iu the Philippine Islands and partly in 
Cuba; but rather than lose a treaty and resume hostilities I would, 



48 PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY AVITH SPAIN. 

as another propo.sition, be willino- to take the Carolines in addition to 
all the Philippine Islands, and in return for the Carolines and for 
past pacilic expenditures in them and in the Philippine Islands I would 
be willing to give a lump sum of from twelve to fifteen million dollars, 
providing ultimately for this sum out of the revenues of the islands; 
and, finally, as a last concession from this second proposition. I would 
not sacritice the treaty for the sake of retaining Mindanao and the 
Sulu group. 

WlIITELAW ReID. 

(5) It is my opinion that the existing situation reiiuires that the 
United States present without much delay an ultimatum insisting upon 
the signature of a treaty for the cession b\' Spain of the entire Philip- 
pine Islands archipelago, Puerto Rico, and Guam and the relinquish- 
ment of sovereignty over Cuba. I am also of the opinion that we 
should pay no money to Spain on account of her debt or on any other 
account whatsoever, and that we should so declare in an ultimatum, if 
necessary. It now appears that Spain has paid nothing for any })acitic 
improvements in the Philippine Islands. They have all been paid for 
by the proceeds of local taxation of the islands. I believe that one of 
the purposes of Spain in protracting these negotiations is to entangle 
the United States with some of the European powers. The Spanish 
commissioners have reoccupied their iirst position, that the United 
States shall assume or be bound for the so-called colonial debt, and it 
is plain that so long as her connnissioners thus contend the negotia- 
tion stands just as it did at its beginning. I do not believe we shall 
ever get a treatv except as a result of such an unyielding ultimatum. 

Friday morning, 29th. 

C. K. Davis. 



Mr. Hay to Mr. Day. 

[Telegram.l 

Washington, Novemher 13., 1898. 
A treaty of peace is of the highest importance to the United States 
if it can be had without the sacrifice of plain duty. The President 
would regret deeply the resumption of hostilities against a prostrate 
foe. We are clearh" entitled to indemnity for the cost of the war. 
We can not hope to be fully indemnified. We do not expect to be. 
It would probably be difficult for Spain to pay money. All she has 
are the archipelagoes of the Philippines and the Carolines. She surely 
I can not expect us to turn the Philippines back and bear the cost of the 
war and all claims of our citizens for damages to life and property in 
Cuba without any indemnity but Porto Rico, which we have and 
which is wholly inadequate. Does Spain propose to pa}' in mone v the 
cost of the war and the claims of our citizens, and make full guar- 
anties to the people of the Philippines, and grant to us concessions of 
naval and telegraph stations in the islands, and privileges to our com- 
merce the same as enjoyed by herself rather than surrender the archi- 
pelago? From the standpoint of indemnit}' both the archipelagoes are 
insufficient to pay our war expenses, but aside from this do we not 
owe an obligation to the people of the Philippines which will not per- 



PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. 49 

mit US to return them to the .sovereignitv of Spain i Could we justify 
ourselves in such a course, or could we permit their ])arter to some 
other power f Willing or not, we have the responsihility of duty 
which we can not escape. 

You are therefore instructed to insist upon the cession of the whole 
of Philippines, and, if necessary, pay to Spain ten to twenty millions of 
dollars, and if you can get cession of a naval and telegraph station in the 
Carolines, and the several concessions and privileges and guaranties, so 
far as applicable, enumerated in the views of Counnissioners Frye and 
Reid. you can offer more. The President can not believe any division 
of the archipelago can bring us anything but embarrassment in the 
future. The trade and commercial side, as well as the indenuiity for 
the cost of the war, are questions we might yield. They might be 
waived or compromised, l»ut the questions of duty and humanity appeal 
to the President so strongly that he can find no appropriate answer 
but the one he has here marked out. You have the largest liberty to 
lead up to these instructions, but unreasonable delav should be avoided. 

Hay. 



JL: Day to J//-. Adee. 

[Telegram.] 

Paris, November 15, 1898. 
(For the President. — Special. ) 

Your final instruction on Philippine Islands received. We are for- 
mulating- proposals for treaty in accord therewith. Spaniards asked 
and we granted adjournment to Wednesday. They say have not 
received copies from Madrid, which are needing. It is probable that 
Spanish commissioners will not sign treatv. but this is only surmise. 
Spanish sources are filling European press with charges of violation 
of protocol and understanding at Washington in claim now made for 
Philippine Islands. You have no doubt seen our counter statement 
sent out by Associated Press. If we break, I think pretty full synopsis 
of correspondence and negotiations leading to protocol should appear 
in American, also in friendly press on this side. We shall pursue this 
course unless you disapprove. 

Tuesdav morning, 2.30. 

Day. 



Mr. Hay to Mr. Day. 

[Telegram. J 

Special.] Department of State, 

Washington^ November 15, 1898. 

The President earnestl}' hopes there may be no break, but approves 
the suggestion made in j'our special of this date. 

Tuesday afternoon. Hay. 

S. Doc. 148 4 



50 PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. 

Mr. Moorr to J/r. Jl((i/. 

[Telegram.] 

No. 24. Special.] Paris, Aoreiuhcr 7J, 1898. 

Unless otherwise iiistnuted. the Anieriean eoininissionei-s propose 
to present to the .'^junish eoiniuissioners, perhaps at the joint ineetin^- 
to-morrow, the following proposition as enil)odying tinal position of our 
Government in the present negotiations: 

The proi)<x«al presented by the Aniericaii rdiimiit'sionei-s in l)ehaU'of their (iovern- 
nieiit for the eession of tlie Philippine Islands to the United States liaving been 
rejected by the Spanish conniiissioners, and tiie counter proposal of the latter for the 
withdrawal of the American forces from the islands and the jiaymeiit of an indemnity 
by the United States to Spain havinj; been rejected by the American commissioners, 
the American coinniissioners, deeminjr it essential that the present negotiations, 
which have already Ijeen jrreatly protracted, should be brouj;ht to an early and defi- 
nite conclusion, beg now to present a new proposition, endiodying tlie concessions 
which, for the sake of peace, their (iovernment is, under the circumstam-es, willing 
to tender. 

The Government of the United States is unable to modify the jtroi>osal heretofore 
made for the cession of the entire archijielago of the Phili])pine Islands, l»ut the 
American commissioners are authorized to offer to Spain, in case the cession should 
1)6 agreed to, the sum of twenty million dollars, to be pai<l in accordance with the 
terms to be lixeil in the treaty of jieace; and, it being the policy of the United States 
to maintain in the Philii)pine Islands an open door to the connnerce of the world, 
the American connnissioners are prepared to insert in the treaty now in contempla- 
tion a stiitulation to the effect that for a term of years Spanish shi])s an<I merchan- 
dise shall be admitted into the ]iorts of the Philippine Islaiuls on the same terms as 
American ships and merchandise. The American connnissioners are also authorized 
and prepared to insert in the treaty, in connei-tion with the cessions of terrritory In' 
Spain to the I^nit»'d States, a provision for the mutual relin(|uishment of all claims 
for indenniity, national and individual, of every kind, of the Unitetl States against 
Spain and of Si)ain against the United States, that may have arisen since the i)egin- 
ning of the late insurrection in C'ul)a an<l pri(^- to the i-onclusion of the treaty of peace. 

Upon the acceptance by the Spanish commissioners of the proposals herein made 
as to the Philippine Islands in connection with the demands as to Cuba, Puerto Rico, 
and other Spanish islands in the West Indies and Guam lieretofore jirovisionally 
agreed to, but not otherwise, it will be possible for the joint connnission to ]iroceed 
to the consideration and adjustment of other matters, including those which, as sub- 
sidiary and incidental to the principal provisions, should form a i)art of the treaty of 
peace. In particular the American commissioners desire to treat of religious freedom 
in the Caroline Islands as agreed to in eighteen hundred eighty-six, of the relea.se of 
l>risoners now held by Spain for political offenses in connection with the insurrection 
of Cuba and Philippine Islands; the acquisition of the island of Kusaie or Ualan ^ in 
the Carolines for a naval and telegraph station; and of cable-landing rights at other 
places in Spanish jurisdiction; and the revival (of) certain treaties heretofore in force 
between the United States and Spain. 

Tiiesdaj'^ evening, 6.20. 

Moore. 



Mr. Hay to Mr. Day. 

[Telegram.] 

Special.] Department of State, 

W(uhington. November 16. 1898. 
Your No. 24 received. The course proposed is approved. 

Hay. 

' Kusaie and Ualan are different names for the same island. 



PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. 51 

Mr. Moore to Mr. Hay. 

[Telegram.] 

I 

No. 25.] Paris, November 18, 1898. 

Spanish commissioners yesterda}" presented long- paper in which 
they reply to our last memorandum. Discuss provisions of protocol 
relating- to Philippine Islands, and support by argument their recent 
proposals thereon. The^^ declare that our memorandum al)()unds in 
grave errors of fact and strange doctrines of law, and deny that they 
have withdrawn their provisional acceptance of our articles on Cuba, 
Porto Rico, and Guam; that acceptance, however, was conditional 
upon agreement on whole treaty and was given for compensation which 
might be obtained in other articles for sacrifice of Spain as to debts, 
but only subsequent development in negotiations is the demand for 
cession of the Philippine Islands, Spanish commissioners would there- 
fore have been justified in insisting on claims as to transmission of 
colonial obligations and debts, but have confined themselves to con- 
tradicting affirmations to which they could not assent. They quote 
royal decrees and the text of bonds to disprove that greatest part of 
the Cuban debt was contracted in the eli'ort first to conquer Cuban 
insurgents and then to oppose the United States, as well as to show 
that colonial revenues were primary security for debt. 

They maintain legal right of Spain so to contract the debt and the 
legal validity of the debt so contracted, and cite our demands that 
Spain suppress rebellion and maintain order in Cul>a as a proof of our 
recognition of her sovereignty in the premises and the legitimacy of 
its exercise for that purpose ; but in concluding this part of the paper 
they sa}^ the duty of defending the bondholders does not belong to 
Spain; that it is sufficient for her to defend the legitimacy of her 
action, her perfect right to create the debt and the mortgage by 
which it was secured, and her strict right not to pay interest or principal 
except upon proof of insufficiency of mortgaged revenues. The respon- 
sibility of failing propei'ly to apply revenues will rest on those Avho 
control them, and not upon Spain, who has not the means to compel 
the performance of the duty, Spain neither will nor can do anything 
to impair the rights of bondholders, who can without great eftort 
demonstrate [the] justice of their cause. 

Spanish commissioners then discuss Article III of the protocol and 
contend that it should be read in light of prior negotiations. They 
quote telegram of August 1 to CamTjon saving that three [sic — our ^] 
demand seemed to lack precision; that Spanish Government supposed 
there was no question in regard to Spain's permanent sovereignty 
over archipelago and that occupation of Manila, its harbor and ba}^, by 
the United States would last only during the time necessary for two 
countries to agree on administrative reforms, The}^ then refer to 
Cambon's interview with the President of August 3 and to dispatch 
of Spanish minister for foreign afi'airs of August 7, and say that 
never till now has the United States consented to give concrete form 
to the idea involved in the phrase "''control, disposition, and govern- 
ment" of the Philippine Islands. If the United States meant that 
joint commission should determine the sovereignty' of the group b}^ 
agreeing or disagreeing to its cession to the United States, why did it 
not say so? 



52 PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. 

American c-oininis.sionors say that word "coiitror* must 1h' construed 
in the sense of authority or command, because that is its l)roadest mean- 
ing? in Enjj-lish, hut fail to notice that the protocol was also written 
and sitrned in French, and that the French word "controle"' means 
only investigation or inspection. The word *' disposition. '■ while it 
conveys the Idea of alienation in private law. usually means in French 
distribution according- to a certain and determined ordei-. The word 
•'government" may mean the right of adniinisttMing or exercising 
sovereiti-nty. but may also signify manner of governing or form which 
may be" given to government. The words therefore do not possess 
a clear and precise meaning, incapable of doul)t or aml)iguity. and 
yet it was the Ignited States, not Spain, that insisted upon retaining 
them and refused to explain them. Vattel. Volume III. page 1!>7, 
declares that dout)ts nmst be resolved against him who gives the law 
in the treaty, since it is his fault not to have expressed himself with 
more clearness. The party \\ho dictates conditions should not ha 
allowed to convert vague or ambiguous term> into bonds to tic u}) the 
more feeble contracting party. 

In the American note of July 3o it was said that if the terms oH'ered 
by the United States were accepted in their entirety connnissioners 
• would be appointed to settle the details of treaty of peace, etc. Could 
unexpressed (hMuand for cession of inunense territory . with a population 
of 9,000.000 inhabitants, have been considered as a detail of the treaty ( 
Spanish commissioners here review at some length interviews of Cam- 
bon with the President and compare versions thereof, and contend that 
by the note of Spanish Minister for Foreign Atlairs of August 7 
Crovernment reserved a j>ri(>ri\\.^ sovereignty over rhilii)piiie Islands, 
and that Article III of the protocol can in law bind it only witii this 
reservation, which was never withdrawn. They say that the only 
objection made in our note of August 10 to Spanish note of August 7 
was that the latter was not entirely explicit, owing to various trans- 
formations which it had undergone. This, they maintain, could not 
have referred to paragraph on "Philippine Islands, since it ('xplicitly 
reserved a jrriorl Spanish sovereignty over the islands. The Paris 
conference is therefore authorized to determine only their internal 
regime. 

Spanish commissioners then proceed to support their last proposals 
as to what should be done regarding Philippine Islands in the treaty 
of peace. They disclaim intention to assert that General Merritt and 
Admiral Dewev had knowledge of protocol when they took Manila on 
August 18. but refer to the Admiral's message to the governor of 
Manila of May 1 threatening to destroy city if all vessels, torpedo 
boats, and warships under the Spanish Hag were not immediately sur- 
rendered, and say they })resume this message will have no place in the 
chapter of history in which are recorded the services rendered to the 
cause of humanity of which there is so much ostentation in these days. 
Thev also refer "to circumstances in connection with delay in taking 
Manila; that the number of insurgents about the city increased because 
of postponement of it, and complains of statement in American memo- 
randum that the captain-general tied before the surrender. They 
maintain that our occupation of ^lanila pending the conclusion of the 
treaty of peace was intended and agreed upon merely by way of a guar- 
anty,"^ and that protocol makes no connection between future occupa- 
tion of the place and the payment of a war indemnity. 



PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. 53 

They observe that the American commissioners do not in their 
memorandum argue that suspension of hostilities did not go into effect 
immediately, but that they endeavor to invalidate the Spanish claim 
as dilatory. They state that this claim was made twenty-three days 
after capitulation and inquire what law or practice forfeits such a 
claim unless presented before the twenty' -three days reckoned from 
the act giving rise to it. Even if the claim had not been then pre- 
sented, the Spanish commissioners might present it now, since thej- 
are empowered to ask for a faithful execution of the protocol. They 
quote from Wharton's International Law Digest that compacts be- 
tween enemies should be specially adhered to as of immediate interest 
and duty, not onh" to the parties but to all mankind. The}' combat 
the argument that occupation of Manila under the protocol is same as 
or equivalent to a military occupation by conquest. 

They contend that (occupation i) by force of a territory which sur- 
renders through an act of war has a special name, which is "capitula- 
tion," and that to call by this name the occupation under the protocol 
in order to bring it within the terms of the illegal capitulation of 
Manila after the protocol was signed is an error never heretofore 
officially or scientitically made. They contend that occupation as a 
guaranty conveys no greater right than to maintain a military force 
in that territory till the performance of the principal obligation, and 
that the occupying party has therefore usually taken care even to 
stipulate for the taking of provisions for his forces. The occupa- 
tion under the protocol can not be considered as a military one. since 
it was not effected ])y force not as the result of a belligerent operation. 
jNIoreover. it was after August 16, when the American commanders 
heard of the protocol, that they began to take possession by military 
force of the machinery of government, of the pulilic moneys, revenues, 
and imposts. 

Spanish commissioners say they might here bring the paper to a 
close did they not desire to tind some way in harmony with senti- 
ments of humanity and patriotism of both commissioners to remove 
obstacles to peace: this can be done only through the bona tides of both 
parties; the commissioners are equally divided. The United States 
does not go further than to claim that under the protocol it has right 
to ask for the sovereignty over Philippine Islands. It does not claim 
the right to order the cession to be made. Shall the negotiations then 
be broken off' and hostilities renewed^ Can not the good faith of the 
parties suggest some means of averting these terrible consequences i' 
The commissioners might agree to leave the question of sovereignty 
over Philippine Islands for direct negotiations between the two Gov- 
ernments, and continue meanwhile the discussions of all other points 
to be embodied in the treaty. This method is, however, attended with 
the danger of the Governments failing to agree. The Spanish com- 
missioners think it more sensible and more sure for the two commis- 
sions to agree to propose to their Governments an arbitrator or a tri- 
bunal of arbitration to determine the true sense in which Articles III 
and VI of the protocol should be taken. 

If there is any controversy between nations which men of goodwill 
should endeavor to settle by justice and equity it is that of a differ- 
ence as to the interpretation of a treaty. Sovereigns may refuse to 
submit to judgment of a third party that which affects their honor or 
even their amour propro. but in the modern and Christian world it is 



54 PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. 

inooiu'civable they should prefer covering earth with corpses and del- 
uging- it with human blood to submitting their own opinions on a mat- 
ter so exposed to tallil)ility as the sense which a party to a treaty may 
desire to give it. The United States, say the Spanish commissioners, 
have to their glory taken among civilized peoples the initiative in 
appealing to the humane, rational, and Christian method of ai'bitra- 
tion, rather than intiict bloody war. The senate of Massachusetts in 
1835 approved the proposal for creation of an international court to 
settle all ditferences between countries. In 1851 Committee on For- - 
eign Relations reconnuended insertion of arbitration clause in treaties, 
and the Senate approved a report in 1853. 

In 1873 the Senate again, and in 1874 l)oth Houses of Congress, i"eaf- 
tirmed this humanitarian aspiration; and tinally. in 1888. not satistied 
with havinu' marked out a line of conduct so laudable, both Houses of 
Congress adopted joint resolution i-ecjuesting the President to use his 
influence to induce governments maintaining diplomatic relations with 
the United States to submit questions that might arise between them 
in future to arbitration. The Spanish counuissioners declare the^ hope 
that the case before the Paris conference will not lead the United 
States, by departing from such glorious precedents, to wish to settle 
the difticulty by the last means which among national and free beings 
is sadly inevitable, although it may never ))e lawful, in the absence of 
other means moi'e humane and tending to preserve unalterable peace 
among men. 

Our conmiissioners propose to reply to this and reaflirm their pri>- 
vious position, and to make, unless otherwise instructed, the proj)osal 
conveyed to you in my special of November 15, and give the Spanish 
commissioners a week in which definitely and finally to accept it. 

MOOKK. 



J//'. Ihnj to Mr. D'l'j. 
[Telegram.] 

Washington, Novemher 18, 1898. 
Dewey telegraphs entire island of Panay in possession of insnrgents, 
except Iloilo, which is defended by 8(>o Spanish troops. Foreign citi- 
zens beg for American protection. Island of Negros has declared 
independence, and desires American protectorate. 
Fridav, 2 afternoon. 

Hay. 



J//'. JJay to J/r. Adee. 

[Telegram.] 

Paris, Xovemhcr 18, 1898. 
(Special. — For the President. ) 

Secretary- Moore has just sent telegram advising of Spani.sh reply 
received yesterday, translation finished this morning: also advi.-^edour 
intended course, which I hope you will approve. As to negotiations 
preceding protocol, there are sharp diflerences in some respects between 



PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. 55 

Camboivs reports, as quoted by Spanish commission, and my uu'morandu 
of same conversations, which, you remember, were made shortly after 
each interview, submitted to you, corrected, and transcribed in tvpe- 
written form, which I have with me. You can read in connection 
with this [the] correspondence leading- to protocol, pamphlet publica- 
tion. Cop}'' in the Department of State if you have not one at hand. 
After delivery [of] our note [ofj July 30, to Duke de Almodovar. 
Cambon came to White House Auoust 3. They quote from his report: 

I availed myself of this declaration to recjuest the President to have the kindness 
to state as precisely as possible his intentions in regard to the Philipjnne Islands. On 
this point I told him the answer of the Madrid Government was clrawn up in such a 
way as to admit of all demands on the part of the United States and consequently of 
all kinds of apprehensions on the part of Spain in regard to her sovereignty. !Mr. 
McKinley answered: "I do not want any misunderstanding to remain upon this sub- 
ject, and neither of the two countries shall be the ones to l)e called upon to decide 
what are the permanent advantages we shall ask for in the archipelago and finally 
those to decide the intervention [controle], disposition, and government of tht- 
Philippine Island," and he added: "The Government of Madrid can rest assured that 
up to the present nothing against Spain has been settled a priori in my own miml, as 
I myself consider that nothing is decided against the United States." 

M}' memorandum shows on same date. August 3: 

Ambassador reported Spanish Government had received American answer; that it 
would be regarded by Spain as very severe, etc. French amba.ssador said there was 
a disposition to believe in Spain that United States intended to take the Philippine 
Islands group. That Government appreciated that reforms were necessary in the 
government; that American privileges be granted in the islands; but that Spanish 
suzerainty should not lie interfered with was a matter that Spanish minister would 
insist upon. President answered that <iue.<tion of Cuba. Porto Rico, the Ladrones, 
and West Indies islands admitted of no negotiation; that the disposition of the 
Philippine Islands must dejjend upon the treaty that might l>e negotiated; and that 
he, the President, could not make any change in the teims heretofore submitted. The 
ambassatlor called attention to the wording of the note of July .30 as to pos.«ession of 
the city, bay, and harbor of IManila to l)e retained during the pendency of the treaty, 
and asked what was to be done with them afterwards. President said that must 
depend upon the terms of the treaty. Ambassador inquired whether the United 
States had iirejudged the matter of the Philippine Islands and the rights to be 
acquired therein l)y the United States." President said case has not been jirejudge*! 
as far as concerns this Government or the Spanish Government. Whole matter 
would be left to the commissioners for negotiation to be settled by the treaty of peace. 
In the meantime the United States would insist upon holding ^Manila, as laid down 
in the note. Its disposition thereafter, as already said, would depend upon the terms 
of the treaty. 

Spanish commissioners then take up C'limboirs report [of] interview 
of July 30 and our note of tlmt date presented to him for transmission 
to Spain. Spanish commi.ssioners state Cambon"s report as follows: 

The demands formulated in Article III, I (Cambon) said to the President, are apt 
to endanger in Madrid the success of this preliminary negotiation, especially if the 
word " jiossession" is retained in conjunction with control and government of the 
Philippine Islands, as it seems to put in doubt from this moment the sovereignty of 
Spain over that colony. You will notic-e tlie President of the Republic told me that 
his deniands in article first and second admitted of no discussion. " I ( the President) 
leave it to the negotiators to decide the question of the Philippine Islands." Seeing 
that the President of the Republic was firm in not changing the terms of Article III, 
I made such an urgent appeal to his generosity as to secure his order to use the word 
" dispo.sition " instead of ' " posses.siou, " as the former does not prejudge the result of 
negotiations and has not the comprehensive meaning which belongs to the other 
word. 

My notes show that at that time, July 30 — 

The President said that as to the Philippine Islands the note expressed the purpose 
of this Government, and their final disi)osition would depend upon the treatv to be 
negotiated by the commissioners and ratifietl bv the interested Governments. Am- 



5G PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. 

bassador read the paragraph ooneerniog the Philippine Islands and characterized it 
as harsh. "Thetie are very hartl terms." Siiid the ambiissador. to which the President 
inquireil in what jiarticular. The ambassador sugirested, in reg-ard to the PhiHppine 
Islands, that it might be the acquiring by the Uniteil States of all of them, to which 
the President replied that that would l>e determined by the treaty. The amba.>*.<iidor 
said that if it was a station or commercial base, that might l>e concevletl by Spain. 
Ambassador addeil particularly that the won.1 "possession" translated in Spanish in 
such wise as to be regardeil as an expression of a severe, threatening nature, and sug- 
gested a change in that word. He suggeste<l at tirst the wonl "condition." The 
i*resident Siiid he would not change the word except for a word of a similar imix>rt 
or meaning. The word "disposition" l^ing suggested, after considerable talk the 
President consented that that word, not changing the meaning, might lie substitutetl 
for the word "possession." Indeed, the word "disposition" was the broader one 
of the two and would clearly include " posset^sion. " Accordingly the note was so 
changeil without other changes, and was handed to French amiwssi\dor to be com- 
municated to Spanish Government. 

These report.^, not dirtictilt of reconciliation, have k\-<s ditference 
than reports concerninir interviews of Auiru.'^t i*. when [thej Duke of 
Ahnodovar's note of Auofust 7 was presented to the President. They 
quote C'ainbon as foUows: 

Duke Ai.MorH>VAK: 

Again has it bei>n at the White House, in the pre.-^eni-e of Mr. McKinley and at his 
express re^piest. that I have conununicated to the .Secretary of State the note of August 
7, in which your excellency declares that the Government of Spain accepts the condi- 
tions imix>se<i by the Uniteil States. This reading visibly displeased the President 
of the Republic and Secretary of State. After a long silence. Mr. McKinley said to 
me: " I had askeil of Sj>ain the c^ession. conseijuently the imme<liate evacuation of 
the islands of Cuba and Porto Rico. Instead of the categorical acceptame I ex]>eeteil 
the Spanish G<n-ernment ad<lres.<es me a note in whii-h it invokes the neces.<ity of 
obtaining the approval of the Cortes. I can not lend myself t<« going into these con- 
siderations of an internal nature." I (Cambon ) observeil that the « iovernment of 
Her Majesty in complying with its constitutional duties did no more than follow the 
President, ujxin whom like obligations are imjM-ised. an<l that in his reply of July :iO 
he had expressly reserveil the ratification by the Federal Senate. 

The Spanish commissioners further (luote: 

President ende«i V^y answering Mr. Cambon. who questioned him ag to the pletlges 
of sincerity Spain might give. a.< follows: "There must V)e a means of jnitting an end 
to all misunderstanding. We might draw up a pmjei-t which shall reproduce the 
conditions projH^se*! to Sj^in in the same terms in which I have alrt'a<ly framed 
them, and which shall establish the tenus within which there shall l>e name<l on the 
one hand the pleniixnentiaries charge<l with negotiating the treaty ttf peace in Paris 
and on the other hand the spei-ial conunissioners intru.stttl with the determination of 
the details for the evacuation of Cuba an<l Porto Rico." 

Spanish commissioners add the important comment: 

Neither the FVesident nor the Secretary of State advance<i any reason for their 
displeasure other than the foregoing, and according to Mr. Camlxm the-^e gentlemen 
said nothing during the conversation respe«^'ting the said reservation made by Spain 
of her sovereignty over the archipelag<^. nor regarding anything else whatever save 
the reservation of the Spanish (Jovernment as to the approval of the Cortes. 

My notes show, as to the part in reference to the Philippine Isknds: 

While in one part it (the note of August 7) stated its acceptance, in another it 
seemeil to retain the full right of Spanish sovereignty with such refonns. etc.. as 
that Government might see fit to grant. President said that the text of the note was 
not satisfactory to the United States. Aniba^ssador said allowance must be made for 
difference (off translations and for the desire of the Spanish Government to express 
regret at the loss of its colonies: that he (amb;is.«ador) was very confident the inten- 
tion was: to accept in full the tenns of the Unite^l Statt-s. He a.sserte<l that it was a 
full and imqualifieil acceptance of the President's terms. It was then suggeste<l that 
if this be true the l>est way to settle the matter wiis to put the terms in the shape of 
a definite protoi^ol. which the Pre.si<lent would authorize the Secretary of State to 
sisn for the I'nitel States: the aml>a.<sador to submit to the Spanish liovernment its 



PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. oT 

exact terms and the answer to be had whether yes or no. If the Spanish Govem- 
ment accepted the protocol that would end all controversy. Ambassador concurred 
in this view and .said that if the protocol was drawn up in a definite form he would 
submit it to the Spanish Government, and if authorized would exec-ute on its part. 

Spani.-:h fonimissioner.s having heretofore a.s.seited that the Secretary 
of .'*^tat«' at Washinvton. in note of August 10. admitted that Spanish 
note of August 7 contained in its spirit an acceptance hv Spain of con- 
ditions imposed by the United States, in answering this we quote in 
full in our last memorandum my note of that date. Spanish commis- 
sioners now say the\' correct former a.s.sertion. but had based it on a 
telegram from Mr. Cambon of August 11. in which he said: 

Duke: Upon traiLsmitting to me the draft of the protocol, text of which I wired 
your excellency. Secretary of State addressed me a note, which might be epitomized 
as follows: "Although the note delivered yesterday at the White House conveys in its 
spirit an acceptance by Spain of the conditions propose<l by the United States in its 
form, it does not so sf^ecify with .sufficient explicitnes.s, owing doubtless to its having 
to V>e translated and put in cipher .several times," 

This note, (the) Spanish commissioners say. led them into error, and 
they ••nobly comply with the duty of so admitting." 

In fj-aming our answer we shall maintain our version is taken from 
the memoranda made by the then Secretary of State directly after the 
conversations, submitted to the President', by him revised* and then 
reduced to typewritten form: and likewise correspond with the rec- 
ollection of the interviews now entertained by the President of the 
United States and the then Secretary of State. I shall be obliged for 
any comment you mav see fit to make in reply thereto. 

Fridav. 1.3' » afternoon. 

Day. 



J// . I/rnj to Jfr. Day. 

ITelegiam.] 

Washincjtox. yn,'e„(h>r 19. 1898. 
The President approves your proposed action. His recollection of 
oral discussion preceding protocol coincides exactly with vours. 

Hay. 



J//-. Jja,/ f,. Jfr. H<nj. 

[Tel^ram.] 

><'o- ^6.] Paris. Xn,'.nJj.,r 21. 1898. 

AA e presented this afternoon our proposal as telegraphed you in our 
No. '24t. We expressed ex|Dectation of American commissioners that 
final and definite answer be given not later than i^Sth instant. AI.<o 
submitted answer to Spanish [contention ?] as to the construction of 
protocol. They said we should have answer on Wednesday. 

Mondav evening. 1». 

Day. 



58 PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. 

Mr. Day to Mr. Adee. 

[Telegram.] 

Paris, Mveniber 22, 1898. 

(For the President — Special.) 

If the Spanish commissioners refuse our proposij^ion to-morrow we 
shall give notice that our offer was final and nothing- remains except to 
close the negotiations. 

Tuesday, 2.20 afternoon. 

Day. 



Mr. Hay to Mr. Ihnj. 

[Telegram.] 

Special.] Department of State, 

]V((.s},lii(/ton, yoiymher 2?2. 

Your special to the President, dated to-day. received. Your pro- 
l)osed action approved. 

Hay. 



Mr. Ihnj to Mr. ILnj. 

No. 26.] Paris, Nt^venilLr 23, 1808. 

Spanish commissioners did not answer our proposal to-dav. Sent 
note saying- wanted time to communicate with Madrid. Will give 
answer soon. ciMtainly before 28th. 

Wednesdav evening. 10.30. 

Day. 



Mr. Moore to Mr. Hay. 

[TelOfrram.] 

No. 27.] Paris. Nn,',r,ibrr 2o, 1898. 

(Received 2.05 p. m.) 

President of our commission recei\ed last night from the president 
of the Spanish commi.>^sion a communication sulmiitting for adoi)tion, 
in lieu of our final proposition of last Monday, any one of threc^ fol- 
lowing alternative propositions: 

First, reliiuiuishment by Spain of her sovereignty over Cuba and 
cession of Porto Rico and' other Antilles, the island of Guam, in the 
Ladrones, and the Philippine Islands archipelago, including Mindanac) 
and Sulu. to the United States, the latter paying to Spain the sum of 
^100,000,000 as compensation for her sovereignty over the archipelago 
and the works of public utility she has executed during her rule in all 
the islands of the East and West, the sovereignty over which she relin- 
quishes or cedes. 

Second, cession to the United States of the island of Kusaie. in the 
Carolines, of the right to land a cable on any of these or of the]\Iari- 
anas while they remain under Spanish rule, and cession of Philippine 



PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITfl SPAIN. 59 

Islands archipelago proper; thati.s, beginnino- on the north, the islands 
ot'Hatanes, Bal)uyanes. Luzon. Visayas, and all the others, following to 
the south as far as the Sulu Sea, Spain reserving to the south of this 
sea the islands of Mindanao and Sulu, which have never formed a pait 
of the Philippine Islands archipelago proper. The United States, as 
compensation for said islands, for the right to land cables, and for the 
public works executed by Spain in said islands during her rule, will pay 
to Spain the sum of ^50*,0()U,00(i. 

Third, Spain relinquishes her so\ereignty ov(n- Cuba and gratuitously 
cedes to the United States the Philippine Islands Archipelago proper, 
besides Porto Rico, the other West Indies, and the island of (hiam. which 
she cedes as compensation for the expenses of the war and as indem- 
nity to American citizens for injuries suffered since the 1)eginning of 
the last Cuban insurrection. The United States and Spain will submit 
to an arbitral tribunal what are the debts and obligations of a colonial 
character which should pass with the island> the sovereignty over which 
Spain relinquishes and cedes. 

On these i)i"opositions the connnissioners hold the following views: 
Messrs. Day, Davis, and Reid think we are connnitted to our final 
pi'oposition of last ^Monday: Commissioners Frye and Grav favor sub- 
mitting a proposal to leave to Spain Mindanao and Sulu group and 
take instead l^alan or Strong Island in the Carolines, paying only 
§20,000,000. Mr. Day would favor this if it were an original propo- 
sition. He believes that Mindanao and the Sulu group can be readily 
separated from the other islands, and that, with their population, they 
are likely to be a source of trou])le and expense and are not desiral)le 
for us. He thinks Ualan or Strong Island would be very valuable to 
us, and he would prefer it. He also thinks that this concession would 
pro])ably bring a treaty, and that it may be that our present ultimatum 
will; ])ut. as already stated, he thinks our oidy consistent course now 
is to stand by that ultimatum. Commissioner Gray prefers, above all. 
acceptance of third proposition. 

Our commissioners desire to answer president of Spanish commission 
to-morrow. 



Fridav afternoon, 4.3<». 



MOOKE. 



Jfr. I),ir!s to J//'. Uiijj. 

[Telegram.] 

No. 28.] Paris, Kovemher 25, 1898. 

I desire to add to my \'iews. as stated in Mr. Moore's telegram, that 
I think the propositions there stated are an afterthought contrived to 
protract and embarrass the negotiations after Si)ain had received our 
deliberate ultimatum, which has been given out as such to our peo])le 
and to the world. The United States, having so taken its position, 
ought not to recede. I think that Spain will accept our ultimatum if 
we Hnnly insist u]x^n it. 

Fridav afternoon, 5. 

C. K. Davis. 



60 PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. 

Mr. Gray to Mr. Ilay. 

[Telegram.] 

No. 29.] Nov. 2.5, 1898. 

Our having submitted an ultimatum does not in my opinion preclude 
us from adopting a course that will prove more advantag(^ous to our 
country, Mv reasons for accepting third proposition in the letter of 
the president of the Spanish commission are, briefly, that in paying 
twenty millions we do not prevent the raising hereafter of the ques- 
tion of the liabilit}' of the sovereign of the relinquished and ceded ter- 
ritory for some part of the so-called colonial debts. When raised we 
must either flatly refuse to consider it and take the consequences, or 
must arbitrate. We have nothing to fear from ar))itration. ])ut have 
much to gain in moral prestige and maintenance of our i)reeminence 
in recognizing the obligations of international law. Bx-^adopting this 
course we pay nothing to Spain, and settle instead of postpone the 
question of liability and cm-vy the principle of arbitration with us 
into the new century. 

George Gray. 



Mr. Hay to Mr. Day. 

[Tek-frram.] 

Washington, Noventhcr '25. 1898. 

(Sent 12 midnight.) 
The President has considered the three proposals of the president of 
the Spanish commission submitted to you. He flnds no reason for 
departing from his last instruction and your proposal thereunder. His 
instructions are that 3'ou adhere to 3'our last proposal and decline those 
of the Spanish commission. 

He repeats his instruction of November 13, by which you are author- 
ized, in case of cession of an island in Carolines and other concessions 
mentioned by Messrs. Frye and Reid, to ofler additional compensation. 
If negotiations in regard to Philippines are successful, you will com- 
municate to the President what amount is required for Strong Island, 
and he will instruct vou. 

Hay. 



3fr. Bay tn Mr. Hay. 

[Telegram.] 

Paris, November 27, 1898. 

Paris Herald to-dav publishes telegram from Washington saying 
we have increased our demand to include Sulu group. This incorrect 
report tends to create impression that we are increasing our claims 
after ultimatum. 

Sunday night, 12. Day. 



PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. 61 

Mr. Day to 2fr. JLn/. 

[Tek'gnmi,] 

No. 31. 1 Paris, NoMuher 29, 1898. 

Spanish coininissioncrs at t()-(la\''8 conference presented a definite 
and final acceptance of our last proposition. Next meetino- on Wednes- 
day, at which time we will present articles on other matters. They 
expressed a desire to reach a conclusion promptly. We hope to make 
good progress from this time. 

Monday afternoon, 8.15. Day. 



The I-fesidciit to j\Ir. Day. 

[Telegram.] 

Exp:cutive Mansion, 

WanJiiiH/ton., November 1i9^ 1898. 

Message just received. Tlie commissioners have my profound 
thanks. 

AViLLIAM McKlNLEY. 



J//'. Hay to Mr. Day. 

[Telegram.] 

Washington, Novemher 29, 1898. 
f In reviving conventional arrangements do not lose sight of copy 
right agreement. 

Hay. 



Mr. Hay to Mr. Day. 

[Telegram.] 

Washington, Novemher 29, 1898. 
The President wishes to know the opinion of the commission as to 
inserting in treaty provisions on the subject of citizenship of inhabi- 
tants of Philippines which will prevent extension of that right to 
Mongolians and others not actually subjects of Spain; also whether 
you consider it advisable to provide, if possible, for recognition of 
existence of uncivilized native tribes in same manner as in Alaska 
treaty, perhaps leaving to Congress to deal with status of inhabitants 
by legislative act. 

Hay. 



62 PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN, 

Ml'. Moore to Mr. Hay. 

[Telegriim.] 

No. 82. J Pakis, Noreiither 29, 1898. 

The American commissioners propose to offer Spain, for cession of 
Kusaie and concession of cable-landint^ rights in other Spanish terri- 
tor3% the sum of a million dollars. 

Tuesda}' afternoon, 12.30, 

Moore. 



Mr. Moore to Mr. Hay. 

[Tcletfram.] 

No. 33.] Pahis, Mmmther 30, 1898. 

Joint Connnission to-day discussed draft of treaty. We proposed 
to apply to the Philippine Islands provisions agreed on by the com- 
missioner's for the evacuation of Porto Kico. Spanish commissioners 
raised the (jiiestion as to whether any agreement was reached as to 
heavy ordnance in fortilications and as to war materials, and expressed 
a desire for retention of such ordnance and materials in the Philippine 
Islands and also in Porto Kico, if not agreed on by commissioners. 
Can you cable us evacuation agreement as to Porto Kico^ 

We tendered admission of Spanish ships and merchandise in Philip- 
pine Islands on same terms as our own for a period of ten years. 
Spanish commissioners propose extension of this privilege to their 
ships and merchandise in Porto Rico for same period and in Cuba 
during oui" occupation. On this proposal. Messrs. Day and Gray 
express the view that if Spanish conunissioners will agree to cede 
Kusaie for amount proposed, grant religious freedom in Carolines, and 
promptly sign treaty as tendeivd by us, they would concede extension 
of privileges granted to Spanish ships and merchandise in Philippine 
Islands to Poito Kico for rive years and Cuba during our occupation, 
but not to exceed live years. In such case they consider it a not 
imreasonable concession to ancient habitudes and to Spanish commerce 
prosti'ated by war. It is not clear to them that such a concession in 
a ti-eaty acquiring territory would open the favored-nation door. For 
precedents for such action on the ])art of the United States see sixth 
article of the treaty with Spain for the annexation of Florida in 1S19, 
and seventh article of the treaty for cession of Louisiana in 1803. Mr. 
Davis states that he is opposed on principle to granting to Spain as to 
Porto Rico and Cuba the conunercial and shipping prixileges which she 
requests. He thinks it should not be a subject of these negotiations, 
but that it should be dealt with b}' Congress. Does not believe that 
these concessions are necessary to secure a treaty. Thinks favored- 
nation clause would entitle certain other nations to same privileges 
we grant to Spain. 

Mr Frye declares he is most emphaticalh' opposed to this propo- 
sition. Kusaie, even without any mone}' pavment, would in nis 
opinion be no compensation for this privilege. Mr. Reid objects to 
commission's taking initiative on a subject (in) no way covered b\- our 
instructions, especially as proposed action would endanger the future 



PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. 63 

extension of present long-stimdino- ])oli('y of Government to Porto Rico 
and Cuba. lie thinks no step of such oravity should be proposed here 
without action of President, if not also of CongTess. Commissioners 
desire instructions on this subject. 

Next joint meetinii' to-morrow l^ p. m. We ha\'e agreed to mutual 
release of prisoners and letui'u to their country by i)arty releasing- them. 

Wednesday, 8.80 evening. 

Moore. 



Mr. Hay to Mr. Day. 

[Teloffram.] 

Washington, December i, 1898. 

Your No. 83 received. 

It was held by us in Porto Rico that the armament of forts, fortifi- 
cations, and fixed batteries were to be included in the surrender and 
taken over into the possession of the United States. The Spanish 
army was to take with it small arms and accouterments, batteries of 
field artillery of 9 centimeters caliber, supply and bag-gage wagons, 
ambulances, and other impedimenta. 

The President thinks it undesirable to include in treaty any prefer- 
ential privileges to Spain in Cu])a or Porto Rico; and if such privi- 
leges tendered l)y you in Philippines are accepted, care should be 
taken to avoid possil)le em})ari'assments to legislation by Congress, or 
demands bv other governments under favored-nation clause. 

Hay. 



Mr. Bay to Mr. Hay. 

[Telegram.] 

No. 35.] Paris, December 1, 1898. 

At this time (Thursday, 8.30 p. m.) we have received no answer to 
our telegram asking for instruction as to Spanish rights in ports of 
Cuba and Porto Rico, and concerning Kusaie. It is important to have 
same to-morrow. 



Thursday evening, 9. 



Day 



Mr. Hay to Mr. Hay. 

[Telegram.] 

Executive Mansion, 

Washington, December 1, 1898. 
Reply sent before receipt of \o\xv 35. 

Hay. 



64 PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. 

J//-. Day to J//'. Hay. 

[Telegram.] 

No. 36.] Paris, Deceiuhrr 3. 1898. 

We iiro unanimously of opinion that unless we are invested M'ith 
discretion to allow for a limited period, not exceeding- live years. Span- 
ish vessels comino- lad(ni only with productions of Spanish growth and 
manufacture directly from the ports of Spain or of her colonies to 
enter ports of Cuba and Porto Rico without paying- other or higher 
duties on cargoes or tonnage than are paid ])y the L'nited States ves- 
sels, it may be impracticable tool)tain anything not contained in our 
ultimatum and therefore necessarily forming sul)iect of mutual con- 
cession, such as Kusaie. and religious freedom in Carolines, the release 
of political prisoner.^, cable-landing rights, and revival of treaties in 
force between the two countries l)efore the war. The privilege above 
mentioned isditi'erent from and nmch more restricted than that referred 
to in our telegram of 30th ultimo, and is in conformity with precedents 
cited in that telegram from Florida and Louisiana treaties. Early 
answer desirable. 



Saturdav afternoon, 3. 



Day. 



J//-. Jlay to J//'. Day. 

[Telegram.] 

December 3. 1898 (midnight). 
The President is still of opinion that preferential privileges to Spain 
in Porto Rico and Cu])a are not desirable. He would even prefer that 
treaty should be made on basis of idtimatum rather than risk the em- 
barrassments which might result from such concessions. 

Hay. 



J//'. Day to Jfr. Hay. 

[Telegram.] 

No. 37.] Paris, Decemler 8, 1898. 

At the session to-day we agreed upon all the al•ticle.>^ of the treaty 
so far as an agreement could be reached. They refused to sell Kusaie. 
Will send you a summary to-morrow as soon as the treaty is engrossed. 
We meet to sign in duplicate; think we can sign on Saturday of this 
week. 

Thursdav afternoon. o.:^0. 

Day. 



J//'. Hay to Mr. Day. 

[Telegram.] 

Department of State, 
Washington., Dece)nher 5, 1898. 
Your No. 37 received. The President sends to all of 3'ou his most 
cordial thanks and congratulations. Permit me to add ni}' own. 

John Hat. 



PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. 65 

Mr. Moore to Mr. Hay. 

[Telegram.] 

Paris, December 10, 1898. 

Treaty as agreed on will coii.sist of preamble and seventeen articles, 
as follows: 

First. Kelinf|uisjiinent of sovcreignt}" over Cul>a and the assumption 
l)v the United States of an}' oblitration under international law for the 
protection of life and property durino- occupation. 

Second. Cession of Puerto Rico and the other islands and Guam. 

Third. Cession of Philippine Islands Archipelao-o and the pa^-nient 
of twenty millions within three months after the exchange of ratifica- 
tions. 

Fourth. Admission of Spanish ships and merchandise to Philippine 
Islands for ten years on the same terms as American ships and mer- 
cliandise. 

I'^ifth. P^vacuation of Philippine Islands by Spain; inunediate return 
(»r Spanish soldiers at Manila by the United States to Spain; disposi- 
tion of war material and armaments in Philippine Islands and Guam. 

Sixth. General release and return of prisoners, military and 
political. 

Seventh. Mutual relinquishment of claims arising since the begin- 
ning of the insurrection in Cuba and before the exchange of ratifica- 
tions, the United States to adjudicate and settle claims of its own 
citizens. 

Eighth. Transfer of public property, archives, records. 

Ninth. Citizenship in relinquished and ceded territories. Spanish 
subjects, natives of the peninsula, may, within a j'ear, elect to retain 
Spanish nationality. Civil rights and political status of native inhab 
itants of ceded territories to be determined by Congress. 

Tenth. Protection of all persons in their religion. 

Eleventh. .Jurisdiction of courts. 

Twelfth. Preservation of pending judicial proceedings. 

Thirteenth. Protection of copyrights and patents in ceded and relin- 
(luished territories. 

Fourteenth. Appointment of consuls by Spain in such territories. 

Fifteenth. Each countr}^ to accord to merchant vessels of other 
same treatment as to its own in respect of port charges. 

Sixteenth, Any obligations assumed by the United States as to Cuba 
limited to time of occupation, but the United States will at the end of 
occupancv advise any government established in Cuba to assume same 
obligations. 

Seventeenth. The exchange of ratitications at Washington within 
six months after signature of treaty. 

Treaty expected to be signed this afternoon. 

Moore. 



Mr. Day Uj 2Ir. Day. 

[Telegram.] 

Paris, December 10, 1898. 
Treatv signed at 8.50 this evening. 

Day. 
S. Doc. 148 5 



66 PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. 

J/r. Moore to Mr. Hay. 

[Telegram.] 

Paris, December 16., 1898. 
Peace Commission sails by the St. Louis from Southampton Satur- 
day, and desires on arrival at New York to go immediately by the 
Pennsylvania road, by special train, if necessary, to \Vashinott)n. The 
commission hopes to present the treat}' to the President December 24. 

MOOKE. 

O 



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